Between Washington and Beijing: can Central Asia preserve its multi-vector technology policy?

The United States is preparing to tell dozens of partner countries that they may have to choose between American and Chinese approaches to cooperation in artificial intelligence. In effect, Washington is asking its allies and partners to take a clearer position as global technological competition between the United States and China intensifies.

According to a draft letter from the US State Department seen by Reuters, the issue concerns 35 countries that signed the American AI Opportunity Statementadopted in June. The draft letter warns that these countries may not be able to participate simultaneously in the US-led Pax Silicainitiative and a competing Chinese initiative on artificial intelligence.

As AI becomes increasingly connected to semiconductor manufacturing, critical minerals, energy, data centers, computing capacity and national security, Central Asian countries will face growing pressure over their choice of technology partners.

1. Is it realistic to expect Central Asian countries to choose between American and Chinese AI ecosystems?

It is realistic to expect Washington to become increasingly demanding about where its partners stand on certain sensitive technologies. It is much less realistic, however, to expect Central Asian countries to abandon their multi-vector foreign policies and choose one technology ecosystem at the expense of the other.

This distinction is fundamental. The United States increasingly views artificial intelligence not simply as an economic sector, but as a strategic technology ecosystem that includes advanced semiconductors, computing capacity, data centers, critical minerals, energy infrastructure, research networks, technology standards and investment.

From Washington's perspective, a country's participation in China-linked initiatives such as WAICOmay therefore raise questions that go far beyond AI regulation itself. The American argument is that technology partnerships can create long-term dependencies and may potentially facilitate the transfer, spread or circumvention of restrictions on technologies that Washington considers strategically sensitive.

This is why the State Department draft letter is important, even though, according to available information, it has not yet been sent to its recipients and its contents may still change. The main message behind the initiative appears to be that Washington sees participation in Pax Silica not simply as membership in another international forum, but as a strategic commitment.

WAICO and Pax Silica are not mirror-image organizations: One important point should be kept in mind: WAICO and Pax Silica should not be treated as fully symmetrical organizations. Pax Silica is primarily focused on the security and resilience of critical technology supply chains - from minerals and energy to semiconductors, computing infrastructure and artificial intelligence.

Based on available information, WAICO places much greater emphasis on building national capacity, international AI governance, access to technology, workforce development and greater participation by developing countries in the emerging global AI ecosystem.

It may therefore be more accurate to describe them not as two identical "AI blocs", but as two competing approaches to the emerging technological order. The American approach can be broadly described as: "Secure the technology ecosystem." The Chinese approach is more focused on another idea:"Expand access to the technology ecosystem."

For countries in the Global South, the second approach is particularly attractive. This does not mean that China is acting purely out of altruism. By providing infrastructure, equipment, AI models, training and technology platforms, Beijing gains clear strategic advantages. The wider use of Chinese technologies also helps spread Chinese standards, products and institutional practices.