Between Washington and Beijing: can Central Asia preserve its multi-vector technology policy?

For example, Kazakhstan's simultaneous engagement with American and Chinese technology and investment partners shows that Astana views technology diversification as part of its national strategy. The same logic applies to a large extent to Uzbekistan, although its economic structure and external partnerships have their own specific features.

For this reason, I would not say that Central Asian countries are already facing an immediate need to "choose sides". Rather, we are entering a period in which the cost of maintaining genuine technological multi-vectorism will increase.

Where will multi-vectorism face limits?

The main problem is that US-China competition is gradually creating two technology ecosystems that may become incompatible in the most sensitive areas. A country can use Chinese technologies in commercial and civilian applications while cooperating with the United States on initiatives aimed at strengthening the resilience of global supply chains.

However, the room for such technological balancing becomes much smaller when it comes to advanced GPUs, dual-use technologies, military AI applications, sensitive government data, high-performance computing and advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Infrastructure directly affected by US export controls is particularly important. In these areas, Washington is likely to demand greater transparency and increasingly seek restrictions on the use of certain Chinese technologies and suppliers.

At the same time, Beijing may be less comfortable with a situation in which a country actively uses Chinese technology infrastructure while participating in initiatives designed to reduce China's role in strategic technology supply chains. This creates a new strategic dilemma for countries that want to cooperate with both the United States and China. Technological neutrality is becoming increasingly difficult precisely where AI, semiconductors, data and computing capacity intersect with national security.

As a result, choosing a technology partner may gradually stop being purely an economic decision and become a question of foreign policy and strategic positioning. A new type of pressure is therefore emerging. The question may no longer simply be: "Are you choosing America or China?" Instead, it may become: "Which parts of your technology ecosystem do you consider secure and trusted?" That is a much more serious question.

For Central Asian governments, the optimal response would be to preserve technological diversification while developing clearer national rules for sensitive technologies. It is important to distinguish ordinary commercial cooperation from strategically sensitive infrastructure rather than treating all Chinese or American technologies as if they were the same.

In other words, Central Asia needs to preserve strategic flexibility while avoiding technological uncertainty in areas where genuine national security concerns exist.

The risks of an "either-or" policy

There is also a broader diplomatic dimension. If Washington begins approaching Central Asian countries with an openly bipolar Cold War-style formula - "either you are with us or against us"- the result could be the opposite of what the United States wants.

Governments in the region may see such pressure as an attempt to limit their sovereignty. As a result, they may become less willing to move closer to Washington and, instead, gain additional reasons to deepen their relationships with China and other partners.