Between Washington and Beijing: can Central Asia preserve its multi-vector technology policy?

The initial response would most likely be diplomatic rather than confrontational.

Uzbekistan would probably emphasize its sovereign right to develop international partnerships based on its national interests and to cooperate with different countries in different sectors.

At the same time, Tashkent would likely seek clarification from Washington about what exactly the United States considers incompatible. This is crucial. There is a major difference between requiring compliance with US export restrictions on certain categories of advanced semiconductors and demanding that Uzbekistan completely end technological cooperation with China.

The first could potentially be negotiated. The second would be much harder to accept. Tashkent would therefore likely try to transform the political question -"Whose side are you on?" - into a technical and legal one:

"Which technologies are restricted? Which suppliers are covered? What security measures are required? What data may be transferred? Which infrastructure is considered sensitive? What alternative technologies and financing mechanisms are the United States prepared to offer?"

Such an approach would allow Uzbekistan to preserve diplomatic room for maneuver. Why Tashkent Has No Interest in Breaking with China. Uzbekistan has serious economic reasons to avoid a sharp deterioration in relations with China. This partnership has developed over many years and includes trade, investment, infrastructure, energy, manufacturing and technology.

Trying to dismantle this network of relationships quickly would create significant economic costs. The possible reaction from Beijing must also be considered. China does not necessarily need to issue a public ultimatum. It has significant economic tools at its disposal.

Chinese companies are important suppliers of infrastructure and technology, while Beijing can use investment decisions, financing, market access and technology partnerships to strengthen its position. For Uzbekistan, the safest strategy is therefore to avoid a situation in which maintaining relations with China comes into direct conflict with access to American technologies.

Most likely, Tashkent will seek a formula along the following lines: Uzbekistan is open to cooperation with the United States in advanced AI, critical technologies and secure supply chains, but such cooperation should not require the termination of legitimate economic and technological relations with other partners.

What Is Uzbekistan Most Likely to Do? I would describe Tashkent's likely approach as "balanced, multi-vector technology diplomacy."

The country will probably seek to:

1. Maintain Chinese investment and access to Chinese technologieswhere they support national development goals;
2. Expand cooperation with the United States and Western partnersin advanced and strategically important technologies;
3. Diversify suppliersso that no single foreign company controls critical digital infrastructure;
4. Develop national capabilitiesin AI research, data governance, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure;
5. Separate commercial technology cooperation from genuinely sensitive national-security technologies;
6. Avoid formal commitmentsthat unnecessarily limit future choices of partners;