Between Washington and Beijing: can Central Asia preserve its multi-vector technology policy?

The United States should therefore focus not only on restrictions, but also on creating an attractive alternative. If Washington wants Central Asian countries to reduce their dependence on Chinese technology, political arguments alone will not be enough. The region needs a real and competitive alternative.

That alternative should include affordable financing, infrastructure projects, modern computing capacity, workforce training, technology cooperation and technology transfer, access to international markets and long-term investment.

For Central Asian countries, what matters most is not political declarations but concrete economic and technological results: Who is ready to build data centers? Who will provide computing capacity? Who will invest in digital infrastructure? Who will train specialists? Who will help local companies reach global markets?

In the long term, therefore, the most effective tool of geopolitical influence in Central Asia will not be a demand for political loyalty, but the quality of the technological and economic alternative being offered.

In other words, if Washington wants to compete with China for influence in the region, it should focus less on persuading Central Asian countries to abandon Chinese technology and more on creating conditions in which alternative partnerships are objectively more attractive, affordable and promising.

2. What Does This Mean for Uzbekistan Given Its Growing Economic Ties with China?

This issue is particularly important for Uzbekistan because its relationship with China has long gone beyond traditional trade. China is one of Uzbekistan's most important economic partners. Chinese companies are increasingly involved in infrastructure, industry, energy, transport, telecommunications and digital projects. Bilateral trade is growing rapidly, while Chinese investment and the number of companies with Chinese capital are also increasing.

According to official data, bilateral trade with China reached almost $18 billion in 2025, while Chinese investment in Uzbekistan increased fivefold to approximately $17 billion. More than 6,000 companies with Chinese capitaloperate in the country.

But an even more important development is taking place: relations between the two countries are gradually moving from trade and investment toward technological cooperation.

In April 2026, Uzbekistan and China agreed to expand cooperation in AI, digital technologies, new materials, green energy and research infrastructure. The agenda includes technology transfer, commercialization of research, joint investment funds, technology parks and exchanges between researchers.

This means that any potential US demand that Uzbekistan "choose" between competing technology ecosystems would not be an abstract question of foreign policy alignment. It could directly affect specific investment projects, technology partnerships and infrastructure already connected to China.

Partnership with China doesn't mean a Geopolitical choice in China's favor