Between Washington and Beijing: can Central Asia preserve its multi-vector technology policy?

For Uzbekistan, this could be a favorable situation - provided that competition among major powers does not turn into a constraint on Tashkent's own political and economic autonomy.

Uzbekistan's technological sovereignty

There is another reason why Uzbekistan needs to maintain access to both technology ecosystems. The country's own AI strategy is still developing. Unlike the United States or China, Uzbekistan does not need to protect an already established national AI ecosystem from an external competitor. Its task is to build a competitive AI ecosystem of its own. That requires the widest possible access to knowledge, computing resources, investment and human capital.

From a strategic perspective, it would therefore be unwise to voluntarily cut off access to Chinese AI technologies, particularly relatively affordable and open technologies. The main goal for Uzbekistan should not be isolation from individual technology partners, but diversification.

At the same time, as the digital economy develops, increasing attention must be paid to ownership and control of critical digital infrastructure. It is essential to know who owns key data centers, where sensitive government data is stored and who controls cloud infrastructure.

Other important questions include whether algorithms can be independently audited, how easily a foreign supplier can be replaced, and whether the country could face excessive costs when switching to another technology platform.

Another major risk is vendor dependence. If moving to another platform is prohibitively expensive, or if critical systems cannot be operated without foreign specialists, formal diversification of suppliers does not guarantee real technological sovereignty.

Uzbekistan therefore needs to develop its own capabilities and train specialists who can independently operate and maintain critical digital infrastructure. Ultimately, control over data, infrastructure, technology and key expertisewill determine the country's level of digital sovereignty.

From this perspective, the formal question of whether Uzbekistan participates in WAICO or a particular US initiative is less important than whether the country retains the ability to make its own technological decisions and change partners without suffering critical economic or infrastructure losses.

Digital sovereignty should not mean rejecting foreign technology. It should mean being able to use foreign technology without losing the ability to make strategic decisions independently.

3. How Is Uzbekistan Most Likely to Respond to a Direct US Approach?

If Washington officially asks Uzbekistan to choose between American and Chinese approaches to AI cooperation, Tashkent is likely to respond cautiously and avoid accepting the idea that it must make a geopolitical choice.