Between Washington and Beijing: can Central Asia preserve its multi-vector technology policy?

Use competition among major powersto secure better investment conditions and technology transfer.

Therefore, Uzbekistan's likely response to a US approach will not be a simple "yes" or "no." The position will more likely be: "We are ready to cooperate with you, but the terms of that cooperation must protect our national interests and preserve our ability to work with other partners."

This is consistent with Uzbekistan's broader diplomatic trajectory. Overall Assessment: From AI Blocs to the Struggle for Technological Autonomy. The most important issue here is not simply the emergence of WAICO or the fact that an American letter is being prepared.

The bigger development is the gradual transformation of artificial intelligence into an instrument of geopolitical and economic power. This is also why the issue should be viewed beyond technology alone: as the Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG) has emphasized in its work on emerging technologies and governance, technological connectivity increasingly depends on the institutional frameworks, regulatory coherence and international cooperation surrounding it. AI competition is increasingly connecting issues that were previously treated separately: Semiconductors - critical minerals - energy - data centers -
telecommunications - cloud infrastructure - research - education -
standards - investment.

For Central Asia, this creates a complex situation. The region lies between major geopolitical and economic centers while remaining interested in cooperation with all of them. It is therefore important to be cautious about describing the future as a simple confrontation between an "American bloc" and a "Chinese bloc."

A more likely scenario is a period of managed technological competition, in which countries seek to maintain ties with several ecosystems while selectively complying with restrictions in sensitive areas.

Central Asian states are likely to continue defending this flexibility. For Uzbekistan, the key goal should not be technological neutrality for its own sake, but technological diversification and resilience. The country should avoid dependence on a single foreign supplier for critical infrastructure, computing resources, data or AI systems.

At the same time, it should not automatically exclude technologies simply because they originate from one of the major geopolitical centers. The central strategic principle can be stated very simply:

Cooperate broadly, depend narrowly, and build domestic capabilities wherever possible. If major powers genuinely want to strengthen their position in Central Asia, they should compete not primarily for the political loyalty of regional governments, but for the quality of the technologies, investments and partnerships they offer.

The task for Central Asia is to achieve the opposite outcome: to ensure that US-China technological competition increases the region's bargaining power rather than reducing its strategic choices.

Ultimately, the fundamental question for Uzbekistan and its neighbors is not: "Which AI bloc should we join?"

It is: "How can we participate in the global technology economy and the emerging international system for AI governance while preserving our strategic autonomy?"

This will likely become one of the major challenges for Central Asia's technology diplomacy in the years ahead.