Russia, China, and the changing Eurasian balance - and what does it mean for Ukraine?

This creates a strategic paradox. China could gain substantial benefits from Russia's weakening without firing a shot, whereas war over Taiwan would place its military, economy and international reputation under immediate pressure. Taiwan offers immense symbolic and strategic importance at enormous risk; the Russian Far East offers major economic opportunities with comparatively little need for military action. China is unlikely to abandon its ambitions regarding Taiwan, but assuming that its next major strategic move must target the island may be too narrow. The future may instead be marked by Chinese economic penetration of the Eurasian north.

Russia's dilemma

Moscow intended confrontation with the West to restore Russia's status as an independent great power. Yet prolonged confrontation with Europe and the United States has increased dependence on China. The two countries describe their relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership, and in May 2026 Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. But partnership does not mean equality. Chatham House describes the relationship as durable and pragmatic, not a formal alliance. China gains energy, geopolitical cooperation and a secure northern frontier; Russia gains markets, resilience and diplomatic relevance. The relationship nevertheless contains substantial asymmetry and Chinese caution.

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline illustrates the imbalance. Russia has promoted it strongly, while China has remained cautious and sought favourable terms - the negotiating position of the stronger economic partner. Russia's deeper problem is not an impending Chinese invasion but the possibility that it will be unable to develop Siberia and the Far East without Chinese capital, markets, technology and infrastructure. This is a form of imperial pressure that requires no tanks: contracts, investment, pipelines, railways, ports, energy purchases, and infrastructure can turn economic dependence into strategic influence.

The Trump factor

This is unfolding amid turbulent American foreign policy. President Donald Trump has pursued personal diplomacy with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin while confronting Iran. The White House presented his September 2026 meeting with Xi in Washington as a step towards a "constructive relationship of strategic stability," but the summit produced dialogue rather than resolution, with disagreements continuing over Taiwan, technology, Iran and the broader relationship.

American power remains central to the balance. Washington is managing China, Russia, Iran and other challenges simultaneously; the more crises it faces, the greater the strain on its diplomatic and military resources. Europe, and especially Ukraine, risks receiving less attention.

Ukraine in the international system

The international argument over the legitimacy of Russia's invasion has not disappeared. At the United Nations in September 2026, Secretary-General António Guterres again described the full-scale invasion as a violation of the UN Charter, while the General Assembly continued to emphasise Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and the need for a just peace. General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock stressed that territorial integrity cannot be applied selectively and reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties in the first half of 2026 were 114 per cent higher than in the corresponding period of 2024. The United Kingdom also said Russian military action cannot alter Ukraine's sovereignty or internationally recognised borders.

Ukraine's position is therefore part of a larger question: whether the post-1945 international system still means what it says about sovereignty and territorial integrity.

What does the changing China–Russia relationship mean for Ukraine?

The changing relationship presents Ukraine with dangers and opportunities. If Russia becomes more dependent on China, Beijing may gain leverage while continuing to supply markets, industrial goods, technology and diplomatic support that help Russia withstand Western pressure and sustain the war. China has little incentive to see Russia collapse, since a functioning but dependent Russia remains a useful partner and source of energy and resources. The longer this relationship endures, the harder it may become to weaken Russia's war-making capacity. If Washington is preoccupied with China, Iran and other crises, Ukraine may also slip down the American agenda.

Yet a significantly weakened Russia may no longer dominate Eastern Europe, intimidate its neighbours, or project power across its former sphere of influence. Its dependence on China could diminish the strategic autonomy that Moscow sought to restore.

Ukraine's importance extends far beyond its borders. If Russia establishes that conquest can permanently alter the borders of a sovereign European state, the consequences will weaken a fundamental principle of the post-1945 order. If Ukraine survives as a sovereign, independent European state, Russia's attempt to reverse the post-Cold War order will have achieved far less than intended. Ukraine's survival would test whether territorial conquest can again become an accepted instrument of great-power politics.

The larger Eurasian paradox

Russia launched the war to restore geopolitical power and its status as a dominant Eurasian force, yet it risks emerging militarily depleted, economically constrained and increasingly dependent on China. China, meanwhile, can extend its influence across Eurasia without conquest. Taiwan remains profoundly important to Beijing, but an assault carries enormous risks; the Russian Far East offers expansion through investment, infrastructure, energy, trade and long-term dependency.

The future may therefore be shaped less by invasions than by shifts in dependence: who supplies energy, provides investment, builds infrastructure, controls markets, possesses technology and offers diplomatic alternatives. The key question may not be where armies stand, but who needs whom.