Reforming Australian defence: from Cold War relics to an affordable, independent missile and drone deterrent

Australia's defence posture remains anchored in a model forged during the Cold War and refined through decades of close alliance with the United States. Large, expensive platforms - advanced fighter jets, surface warships and heavy armoured formations - dominate the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Yet this configuration is increasingly mismatched with the realities of modern warfare, Australia's geography as a vast island continent, and the need for genuine strategic independence.

Recent conflicts in Ukraine, along the Thai-Cambodian border, and involving Iran have shown that low-cost missiles and drones can neutralise far more expensive armed-systems. A new defence policy should pivot to a locally produced, layered missile and drone force capable of striking potential attackers long before they reach Australian shores.

This approach would deliver credible deterrence at a fraction of the cost of programs like AUKUS while assuming neither perpetual US dominance nor any single country as an inevitable enemy. The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) today fields approximately 59,000 active personnel and 33,000 reserves. Its navy relies on ageing Collins-class submarines, Hobart-class destroyers and a shrinking surface fleet. The air force is transitioning to F-35 Joint Strike Fighters after retiring the F/A-18 Hornets. The army maintains infantry brigades supported by limited armoured vehicles, with recent cuts to infantry fighting vehicle numbers.

These capabilities reflect decades of planning that prioritised interoperability with US forces for expeditionary operations rather than standalone defence of the continent.

A half-century of shifting priorities

Australian defence policy has oscillated for 50 years. In the 1960s and early 1970s, "forward defence" sent troops to Vietnam alongside American and allied forces. The 1976 Defence White Paper marked the first formal articulation of a "defence of Australia" doctrine after the Vietnam withdrawal and the British drawdown east of Suez. It emphasised self-reliance within an alliance framework but still assumed US support in major contingencies.

The then landmark 1987 Defence White Paper, underpinned by the Dibb Review, crystallised this shift. It called for a maritime strategy focused on northern approaches, rejection of large-scale land armies, and capabilities to operate independently in Australia's immediate region.

The 1990s and 2000s saw a partial reversal. Interventions in East Timor (1999), the Gulf Wars, Afghanistan and Iraq pulled the ADF back toward expeditionary roles. White Papers in 1994, 2000, 2009 and 2013 increasingly referenced the rise of China while maintaining the US alliance as the cornerstone.

The 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Strategic Update accelerated focus on the Indo-Pacific. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and 2024 National Defence Strategy introduced "National Defence" and "deterrence by denial." Long-range strike and guided weapons gained priority. Yet implementation remained platform-heavy. Nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS dominated budgets, while other programs faced cuts.

The pattern is clear: every decade or so, policy rhetoric evolves, but the underlying force structure - expensive, alliance dependent platforms persisted.

Vulnerabilities of the Current Model Australia's geography dictated that any serious threat must cross vast oceans or approach through northern chokepoints. A large standing army or heavy armour offers little adversary thousands of kilometres away.

Modern precision munitions render surface ships and air bases vulnerable. One lesson from the Black Sea was unmistakable: cheap unmanned surface vessels and drones have devastated a Russian fleet once considered formidable.