Cultural evolution and Thailand’s Deep South troubles

The attacks have attracted a massive response from the government. The Royal Thai Army has around 50,000 direct and indirect personnel deployed in the area. The army has purchased and deployed urban warfare and rapid response equipment, built hundreds of temporary field camps and road blocks which aren't really suitable and effective against classic Malay hit and hide tactics.

The army in fact is missing the most valuable asset, an effective intelligence network. Army intelligence can't penetrate villages. The separatist organizations themselves are almost impossible to infiltrate. The army doesn't really know what is going on. The only success they have is in cordon-and-search activities in rural areas that weaken insurgent networks but also destroy the army's trust with citizens.

Moreover, perceived army cruelty is part of the problem. The Krue Se Mosque just outside of Patani where armed separatists were attacked by the army in 2004 has become a memorial and tourist attraction. The massacre at Tak Bai the same year, in which 78 young men suffocated after hundreds were loaded onto trucks and stacked atop each other after a violent demonstration, has become folklore. The death of Abdullah Esomusor, an insurgent beaten to death in military detention, led to his funeral becoming a protest which reinforced historical grievances, with 1,000 people attending. The Bo-Ngor Massacre in December last year, in which it was claimedtwo unarmed villagers were shot by rangers who tried to cover up the mistake, led to outrage. Torture in army camps and cordon-and-search operations have been building resentment.

Consequently, the army has withdrawn most of their military personnel from urban areas, leaving it to paramilitary forces to take responsibility. Some highway roadblocks have been removed, and road-side camps decommissioned.

The army's organization would be difficult to dis-assemble and re-deploy elsewhere. This long running dispute is making the army look inefficient, bloated, class-discriminating, and unprofessional, rather than a trim, efficient and professional force.

The crux of the matter is that shifting population demographics, and the will of the younger generation to build an enterprising Malay Patani society in the urban areas, has naturally built the Malay Patani state that the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and BRN philosophically aspired to. The Malay Patani people have asserted strong cultural sovereignty. They have done this with the fear of attacks from the separatists and restrictions of the army, who have both abused human rightsaccording to Human Rights Watch.

This is the situation today. Businesses operate everywhere, night-life is flourishing, freedom to express religious beliefs is strong, there is access to cultural and religious education, and people can participate in mass outdoor events without fear. Practically and effectively, a Malay Patani state – one accepted overtly by the government – exists within the nation of Thailand.

The local civil service is also slowly beginning to reflect local demographics. This may take a little more time. The youth have lost their historical perspective, to be replaced by a Thai-Malay-Muslim perspective. The major issue of the insurgency has actually been resolved through shifting demographics and cultural evolution.

However, this doesn't mean the violence will end anytime soon. Discussions between the army and dissidents may manage the conflict, but not resolve it. Transactive tactical issues can be resolved. However, it will become necessary to change the structure of the process. Malaysia is not as influential as hoped. The Malaysians are not seen as honest brokers by MARA Patani and BRN amid suspicions that separatists can run across the border and hide in safety. Malaysia is extremely hesitant to allow outside observers for fear they lose their prime facilitation position. These and other reasons may be why direct discussions between the Thai government and BRN are desired, away from media attention.

The army and the separatist organizations have become inconvenient players. Both have legitimacy issues. In the end, it will only be the people within the Deep South themselves who have the ability to end the violence. A much wider community platform must be sorted before other undesirable consequences like the spread of extremist Salafi-Wahabism among the young, and violent terror attacks continue and more innocent lives are lost. This must be done before opportunities for peace are passed by as the dispute fault-lines change.