Bush’s Iraq exit strategy

In a major concession that helped ensure both Sunni and Shi'a political support, article 22 stipulates that the US cannot detain Iraqi citizens “except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law” and that if US forces make such an arrest, Iraqi nationals must be handed over to Iraqi authorities immediately. In addition, US combat forces cannot enter Iraqi homes except without a warrant issued by the Iraq government. While this raised the concerns of many Sunni politicians as to the possibility of the manipulation of the political system to focus on arrests and detentions within their own community, it provides some incentives for further political participation to prevent this from occurring.

The nut of the agreement is article 24 that states, “all the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011”. Pending future revisions to the status of “agreed facilities”, this is an unambiguous statement. This is a timetable for withdrawal with a specific date set, something that the Bush administration has said it would never do as it would allow their enemies in Iraq to simply wait it out then re-emerge to strike at the vulnerable Iraqi state.

Rhetoric around this has shifted where the marked decrease in violence, particularly against US combat forces, has allowed many within the current administration to claim that this no longer applies. However, it is important to remember that whilst the 2007 troop “surge” has been one element in the reduction of violence, this was focused on the area around Baghdad. One of the most crucial elements in arresting the devastating violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2007 has been the al-Sahwa (Awakening) movement that neutralised many of the Sunni militias to the north of Baghdad, and the ceasefire with the Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) in Baghdad’s poor Shi'a suburbs.

The latter of these being particularly crucial in that supporters of the Jaish al-Mahdi are present within the ruling coalition and still in control over much of the critical infrastructure around the capital (notably hospitals). If this withdrawal and transition to some form of stable rule is to be successful, these two groups, as well as the Kurdish factions, must be catered for.

This raises two critical points on which the long-term success of this plan will be measured. First, politics is a zero-sum game, particularly in post-conflict states. If a group or community is excluded, and the political institutions are not strong enough to cater for their grievances, then resorting to violence is a likely outcome. In Iraq, each community needs to be given a share of power that effectively exceeds its “entitlement”. In other words, there is a need to over-compensate everyone with limited resources.

Second, the only means by which to get these groups to co-operate is to act through sectarian channels. This will indeed, and already has, served to solidify sectarian divides in Iraq to the point where political parties and modes of power and wealth distribution operate through sectarian channels. This happens across the region, but it is effectively ratified into the political system only in some states (see Lebanon here). This seems an almost unavoidable future for Iraq, and one that must be managed very carefully.

Finally, the SOFA does address some key foreign policy issues for the future of Iraq. Article 25 “normalises” Iraq’s international status at the United Nations, removing provisions relating to its international activity under the Saddam Hussein regime. It also calls on the UN to assist Iraq in resolving its still-outstanding debt to its neighbours from the Iran-Iraq War and 1990-91 Gulf War. Article 27 also states that Iraq will not be used by the United States “as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries”, a seeming overture to Iran. However, this is conditioned with a clear statement that the US retains the right, while still in Iraq to “take all appropriate measures … including … military measures” to deter threats to Iraqi sovereignty.

As such, the SOFA does not bring anything new to the table in terms of a transition agreement that can address the fundamental fragilities that still affect the new Iraq. It is what it is: an exit strategy for US forces. It is significant in that it is a phased transition of the still limited Iraqi sovereignty to the Iraqi government. However, it does not address the concerns over Iraqi constitutional ambiguity, the future of federalism and the status of the key northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, the status of minorities and women under the mixed civil and religious legal code, or how the country’s communities will be included in the political system.