Bush’s Iraq exit strategy

During the tumult of the US Presidential election campaign, the issue of Iraq, and specifically the US troop presence in Iraq, fell down the priority list as fears of the deep recession facing the US economy materialised. Despite the falling importance of the issue of Iraq, as a once dominant subject, it still resonated in discussions and (rather benign) Presidential and Vice Presidential televised debates over the respective foreign policy platforms of both camps.

President-elect Barack Obama campaigned as the “anti-war” candidate: one plank in his platform of “change” that has propelled him to the White House at a time of both domestic and international instability. Central to his claim was not only his stance against the invasion of Iraq during late 2002, as the freshest of freshman Senators, but also a plan for the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq on an 18-month time-line.

Despite being dismissed as a “white flag of surrender” by the Republican Vice Presidential nominee and other members of the Grand Old Party (GOP), this policy was subsequently taken on, not only by the Department of Defence honchos, but also by President Bush. Significantly, Bush has decisively moved to enshrine this policy through the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which was fully approved by the Iraqi Parliament last Friday.

The SOFA presents a massive shift in the Bush administration’s stance on Iraq. It is an exit strategy, and despite efforts at tweaking the historical narrative currently underway through the Bush Legacy Project headed by Karl Rove, it is a massive shift by the GOP and US foreign policy vis-à-vis Iraq. While there is much being said about the symbology of the agreement, its actual content is only just beginning to be dissected.

As with many such documents, the agreement is full of detail on some points and remarkably brief and ambiguous on other, more critical points. The text is divided into 30 articles dealing with issues from the scaling down and withdrawal of US forces, jurisdictions for US forces and civilian/contractor personnel, detention of Iraqi and US nationals in Iraq, liabilities for taxes and duties, movement of people, vehicles and aircrafts, communications, currency, and other matters.

The passing of the SOFA through the Iraqi parliament was only made possible after a measure of cross-sectarian agreement was reached (a notable success), and the inclusion of a provision that it be ratified by referendum at the end of July 2009. This provision has created some ambiguity in terms of the scaling down period prior to the full withdrawal at the end of 2011 that is still being debated.

What is up for negotiation here is the still limited nature of Iraqi state sovereignty, a question that is balanced on both the highly fractious nature of Iraqi sectarian politics - as enshrined in the Iraqi parliament - as well as the on-going factionalism in Washington as to the best way to handle US disengagement from the Iraq war.

The key elements of the agreement are articles 4, 12, 24, 25 and 27, which deal with the status of US combat forces in Iraq (4), the jurisdiction over areas effectively garrisoned by US forces (12), the timetable for withdrawal (24), the termination of UN Chapter VII provisions relating to Iraq (25) and conditions relating to the use of Iraqi territory for US military operations (27).

Article 4 is particularly critical in light of the move to ratify the SOFA via referendum as it deals with the interim draw-down period between now and July 2009 where US forces would essentially be garrisoned in “agreed facilities” outside major cities and towns. Here, US combat missions now must receive the “agreement of the Government of Iraq” and be “fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities” under a newly established body, the Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC). However, the SOFA later states that the US will be responsible for determining whether there has been a violation of law during combat operations outside the agreed facilities, giving it control over what cases appear before the JMOCC.

Despite this, the United States will be given jurisdiction over the areas where US “combat” forces are garrisoned - the so-called “second list … agreed facilities” over which it has “exclusive use”. These agreed facilities shall be exempt from Iraqi taxes and duties, and US forces shall control all entry and exit as well as all contracting within these areas.

This raises a key area dealt with in article 12 on jurisdiction. Iraq has jurisdiction over both US military and civilian personnel outside these agreed facilities but with certain provisions. If a US citizen, military or civilian, is arrested or detained outside these areas, they are to be handed to US authorities immediately within the agreed facilities and be dealt with according to US law. In effect, therefore, the US will exercise de facto sovereignty over its military and civilian personnel outside the agreed facilities and de jure sovereignty over all issues within the agreed facilities prior to the scheduled withdrawal at the end of 2011.

The issue of jurisdiction in such cases highlights the most ambiguous element of the SOFA; co-ordination through the JMOCC. Article 23 states that the committee will be “co-chaired by representatives of each Party” (with “Party” referring to the Iraqi and US authorities). Such co-ordination has proven an intensely complicated task in peacekeeping operations throughout Africa, the Middle East, and in the former Yugoslavia with the clearest case being the dysfunctional efforts at such co-ordination in the Occupied Territories between Israeli and Palestinian officials.

In a major concession that helped ensure both Sunni and Shi'a political support, article 22 stipulates that the US cannot detain Iraqi citizens “except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law” and that if US forces make such an arrest, Iraqi nationals must be handed over to Iraqi authorities immediately. In addition, US combat forces cannot enter Iraqi homes except without a warrant issued by the Iraq government. While this raised the concerns of many Sunni politicians as to the possibility of the manipulation of the political system to focus on arrests and detentions within their own community, it provides some incentives for further political participation to prevent this from occurring.

The nut of the agreement is article 24 that states, “all the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011”. Pending future revisions to the status of “agreed facilities”, this is an unambiguous statement. This is a timetable for withdrawal with a specific date set, something that the Bush administration has said it would never do as it would allow their enemies in Iraq to simply wait it out then re-emerge to strike at the vulnerable Iraqi state.

Rhetoric around this has shifted where the marked decrease in violence, particularly against US combat forces, has allowed many within the current administration to claim that this no longer applies. However, it is important to remember that whilst the 2007 troop “surge” has been one element in the reduction of violence, this was focused on the area around Baghdad. One of the most crucial elements in arresting the devastating violence in Iraq from 2004 to 2007 has been the al-Sahwa (Awakening) movement that neutralised many of the Sunni militias to the north of Baghdad, and the ceasefire with the Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) in Baghdad’s poor Shi'a suburbs.

The latter of these being particularly crucial in that supporters of the Jaish al-Mahdi are present within the ruling coalition and still in control over much of the critical infrastructure around the capital (notably hospitals). If this withdrawal and transition to some form of stable rule is to be successful, these two groups, as well as the Kurdish factions, must be catered for.

This raises two critical points on which the long-term success of this plan will be measured. First, politics is a zero-sum game, particularly in post-conflict states. If a group or community is excluded, and the political institutions are not strong enough to cater for their grievances, then resorting to violence is a likely outcome. In Iraq, each community needs to be given a share of power that effectively exceeds its “entitlement”. In other words, there is a need to over-compensate everyone with limited resources.

Second, the only means by which to get these groups to co-operate is to act through sectarian channels. This will indeed, and already has, served to solidify sectarian divides in Iraq to the point where political parties and modes of power and wealth distribution operate through sectarian channels. This happens across the region, but it is effectively ratified into the political system only in some states (see Lebanon here). This seems an almost unavoidable future for Iraq, and one that must be managed very carefully.

Finally, the SOFA does address some key foreign policy issues for the future of Iraq. Article 25 “normalises” Iraq’s international status at the United Nations, removing provisions relating to its international activity under the Saddam Hussein regime. It also calls on the UN to assist Iraq in resolving its still-outstanding debt to its neighbours from the Iran-Iraq War and 1990-91 Gulf War. Article 27 also states that Iraq will not be used by the United States “as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries”, a seeming overture to Iran. However, this is conditioned with a clear statement that the US retains the right, while still in Iraq to “take all appropriate measures … including … military measures” to deter threats to Iraqi sovereignty.

As such, the SOFA does not bring anything new to the table in terms of a transition agreement that can address the fundamental fragilities that still affect the new Iraq. It is what it is: an exit strategy for US forces. It is significant in that it is a phased transition of the still limited Iraqi sovereignty to the Iraqi government. However, it does not address the concerns over Iraqi constitutional ambiguity, the future of federalism and the status of the key northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, the status of minorities and women under the mixed civil and religious legal code, or how the country’s communities will be included in the political system.