Is a stable regional order attainable in the Gulf?

There is little reason to regard regional ownership and international partnership as alternatives. The United States, Europe, Britain, China and others will continue to have important interests and responsibilities in the Gulf. A stronger regional political framework could complement those relationships rather than compete with them.

For the Gulf states themselves, the question is perhaps even more consequential.

A regional order cannot ultimately be sustainable if those most directly affected by it remain principally subjects of decisions made elsewhere. The smaller and middle-sized states of the region may have less military weight than the major powers, but they possess other instruments of statecraft: the ability to convene, to build institutions, to create channels of communication and to make cooperation attractive to others.

Perhaps the most important legacy of negotiating with unlike-minded nations is the Helsinki experience.

Its history demonstrates how timely statecraft can create strategic space for smaller and middle powers by establishing a framework in which larger powers are bound to interact through rules, institutions and sustained dialogue rather than exclusively through (sporadic) bilateral arrangements.

Pivot to Gulf

Oman's experience is particularly relevant in this respect.

Having visited the Sultanate on a number of occasions, and having had the privilege of meeting the late Sultan Qaboos and working with senior Omani officials, I have long regarded Oman's diplomatic tradition with particular respect. Its influence has rarely depended upon the exercise of power. It has rested instead upon credibility, patience and the ability to maintain relationships across political divides.

There may be circumstances in which those qualities have greater strategic value than ever.

A regional process facilitated from Muscat would not need to begin with grand institutional ambitions. Its strength could lie precisely in allowing the participating states to determine its pace, scope and eventual form. Consensus would be more important than speed; continuity more important than ceremony. Nor would such a process need to define the future security architecture of the Gulf in advance.

Its purpose could simply be to create the conditions in which the countries of the region are increasingly able to shape that architecture themselves. That is a modest objective. It is also a potentially consequential one.

For those of us who have been involved in international security and diplomacy, there is a familiar lesson in this. Durable institutions are rarely created because all the participants have suddenly discovered that they agree. They emerge because governments recognise that continuing disagreement is itself a reason to establish rules, channels and habits through which disagreement can be managed.

The Gulf may now be approaching such a moment.