Is a stable regional order attainable in the Gulf?

The Gulf has entered a new strategic phase.

Recent events have demonstrated the considerable capacity of the Gulf states to protect their societies, infrastructure and economies, and have also reaffirmed the importance of their international partnerships. At the same time, they have illustrated a more difficult reality: military preparedness and external security relationships, however important, cannot by themselves provide a durable answer to the political uncertainties of the region.

There is therefore a wider question worth considering: How can the states of the Gulf acquire greater capacity not only to respond to crises, but to shape the regional environment in which those crises arise?

The answer need not be another alliance or another externally designed security arrangement. It may lie in something less conspicuous, but ultimately more durable: a continuing regional process through which states with different interests and security perspectives can maintain dialogue, develop confidence and gradually identify areas of common interest.

Event vs process

The difference between an event and a process is the difference between (managing) adjustment and (building) an order.

International diplomacy offers one particularly instructive example of the value of such an approach: the Helsinki process.

Its significance did not rest simply upon the agreement reached in 1975. Its enduring importance lay in creating a framework through which states divided by profound political and strategic differences could continue to meet, establish principles, develop confidence-building measures and, over time, change the character of their relations.

The circumstances of the Gulf are, of course, very different. No historical model can simply be transferred from one region to another. But the underlying principle remains relevant: a process of dialogue does not have to wait for agreement on the final shape of the regional order.

Indeed, the opposite may sometimes be true.

Where strategic mistrust is greatest, regular contact can be most valuable. Channels of communication can reduce miscalculation; practical cooperation can create habits of confidence; and modest agreements in areas of common interest can gradually make more ambitious forms of cooperation conceivable.

Maritime safety, crisis communication, protection of critical infrastructure, humanitarian cooperation, disaster response and economic connectivity would all offer possible starting points. None requires governments to resolve their most fundamental political differences before sitting at the same table.

Such an approach would also sit comfortably alongside the security relationships already established by the Gulf states.