Trump and Netanyahu are chasing an illusion in Iran

Second, they have misread the interaction between nationalism and regime resilience. External assault tends to consolidate, not erode, core support for the state. It activates "rally round the flag" dynamics that allow the leadership to suppress dissent while casting itself as guardian of national dignity against foreign aggression.

Third, they have overestimated the opposition's readiness to capitalize on shock. Recurrent protests were interpreted as near pre-revolutionary, when in reality the opposition remains divided and the state has developed calibrated repression, selective concessions, and information control that manages unrest without systemic breakdown.

Finally, both Trump and Netanyahu succumbed to the illusion of control over escalation. They appear to believe they can escalate militarily, severely degrade Iranian capabilities, and still prevent uncontrolled regional war or major retaliation. Tehran has repeatedly warned that any existential threat to the regime or its core programs will trigger a broad, asymmetric response. The current campaign has already triggered a wider conflict it purports to deter.

Netanyahu's "Window of Vulnerability" and Its LimitsNetanyahu's reported argument to Trump rests on an ostensibly compelling reading: Iran's air defenses are weaker; its 'axis of resistance' has lost ground in Syria; its economy is sluggish; public unrest is simmering. In this view, Iran is weaker than it has ever been, and now is the moment to strike.

This analysis is only half right. Iran's air defense, regional posture, and economy have indeed faced strain. But these setbacks have not erased the core pillars of regime survival: a cohesive security apparatus, a resilient missile and drone deterrent, a deep state that can absorb leadership losses, and an opposition unable to capitalize on regime vulnerabilities.

Trump, for his part, has failed to answer two basic policy questions: Why attack Iran-and why now? His public justification relies on "imminent threats" posed by Iran's nuclear and missile programs and its proxies. Yet subsequent briefings reportedly conceded that there was no evidence Tehran was about to strike first.

The campaign, therefore, looks less like self-defense than a preventive war launched on the assumption that a weakened Iran would crumble under pressure. That assumption is not supported by political or strategic realities inside the Islamic Republic.

A policy path away from arrogance

The lesson is clear: rhetoric about regime change should be dropped, and objectives should be narrowed to realistic, defensible aims-deterrence, containment, and verifiable limits on Iran's most dangerous activities. Continuing down the current path risks repeating the worst failures of past regime change adventures.

The United States and Israel do not have to like the regime in Tehran. But they do have to reckon somberly with its resilience-and craft policy accordingly. They must seek a ceasefire and resume negotiations. Iran's foreign minister clearly stated that his country is ready once the US and Israel end their hostilities.