Diverting the Brahmaputra - start of the Water Wars?

The reason for China's intransigence on Tibet is simple. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always referred to Tibet as China's Water Tower and considers it key to sustaining China's northwest in water, revitalising its deserts and the Yellow River itself, as well as being crucial to its Himalayan Strategy.

To guarantee China's water needs, Beijing's excessive and often disastrous policies seriously endanger the survival of hundreds of millions in countries downstream on trans-national rivers that rise in Tibet. One such plan is the unsustainable diversion of a river's flow into north western China. That river is the Yarlung Tsangbo, that when crossing the Indian border, becomes the Brahmaputra.

History

Initially referred to as the Shoutian Canal, the brainchild of hydro geologist Guo Kai caught the attention of the military in 1988.

1989: The "Preparatory Committee for the Shoutian Canal" was formed and headed by three senior generals.

1996: The west became aware of the project.

Late 1990s: 208 NPC (National People's Congress) deputies and 118 CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) delegates produced 16 proposals supporting the project.

May 18-June 22, 1999: An official survey covered 13,600km and calculated that 600B m3 per year of the Brahmaputra waters were being wasted in Tibet.

1999: Jiang Zemin announced the "xibu da kaifa" (Great Western Extraction) that would transfer huge volumes of water from Tibet into the Yellow River. It was now fully supported by 118 generals, and the Politburo. It inspired Li Ling's book How Tibet's Water Will Save China, detailing Guo Kai's “Shuo-tian” (reverse flow) canal as the solution to chronic water shortages in China's dry north and northwest.

2000: Leaked reports include "Chinese leaders are drawing up plans to use nuclear explosions, in breach of the international test ban treaty, to blast a tunnel through the Himalayas for the world's biggest hydroelectric plant".

July 2003: Small article in the People's Daily "China to Conduct Feasibility Study on Hydropower Project in Tibet". The text ran "China plans to conduct a feasibility study in October on the construction of a major hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo River in the TAR. An expert team was sent to the area for preliminary work between late June and early July."

Li Guoying director, Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee said "the project was essential because the Yellow River's current flow is being exhausted by development demands in western China".

November 2005: Strategy manual Save China Through Water From Tibet adopted by the PLA, relevant ministries and directorates.

End 2005: China Hydropower Engineering Consulting Group began analysing hydro potential on sectors of the Yalung Tsangpo.

February 2006: Detailed planning for the "Tsangpo Project" approved by State Council with the full support of Hu Jintao. Chief planner is Professor Chen Chuanyu.

End June 2006: Studies concluded on the potential of the lower reaches of the Yalung Tsangpo.

August 2006: Li Guoying, director, Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee:

… the (Yalung) project was essential because the Yellow River's current flow is being exhausted by development demands in western China … The route isn't especially long, but it's technologically challenging, and it's a matter of resolving the engineering and environmental questions. This project will be launched once the economic and social development of the NW reaches a certain level and the potential of water saving measures is exhausted. The Western Route is a firm plan and will go ahead ... CCP’s leaders and nearly all engineers, claim the W Route will fulfil promises to use rising economic and technological might to lift the less developed west.

Hydro projects now in the planning stages include the Tsangpo Project as one of eight in Nyingchi.

October 2006: Beijing denied any support or approval for the "Tsangpo Project" but referred to Tibet as "an inexhaustible source of water". Construction was already scheduled to commence 2010 as part of the 100B Yuan Tibet capital works program.

Discussion and on ground work has been ratcheted up since early 2003 with reports of intensive activity in the main gorge that Beijing claims to be mineral exploration. Google Earth viewers will find this area blanked out by China.

October, 2007: General Zhao Nanqi said, "Even if we do not begin this water diversion project, the next generation will. Sooner or later it will be done".

The project

The aim is to divert 200B m3 (roughly 33 per cent) of the Brahmaputra's flow into China each year. That 33 per cent uses outdated 1990s data and flawed design philosophy used in the Three Gorges Dam and as then ignores local and international expert advice. Initial proposals include the Soviet practice of PNEs (peaceful nuclear explosions) to blast the tunnels.

At twice the capacity of Three Gorge's the 40GW pumped storage facility will be the world's largest hydroelectric facility. The dam at Shoumatan Point will back up water that will plunge 2,000m through 15km of tunnels near Dagmo and discharge through 26 of the world's biggest turbines into a tributary rejoining the riverbed and reservoir of the storage dam north of Medog. The waters flow will be cut from 200km to 21km.

Pumped storage systems will return water from the storage dam to the holding dam at specific rates. After diverting the original 33 per cent, the volume of returned water determines residual river flow from the holding dam. Authorities refuse to confirm any residual flow rate.

Sacrilege

The site is the Great Bend of the Yalung Tsangpo where it flows around Mount Namcha Barwa on its final run south into India. One of the last pristine regions of the world, it is the world’s most spectacular, and deepest canyon. The Great Bend, known also as Pemakö, is home of the Goddess Dorjee Pagmo, the Protecting Deity of Tibet and revered by all Tibetans. During filling and then commissioning the wild river will be no more.

Promises of electricity

China has promised electricity to its neighbours from this project, but a review of the project suggests serious limits. Pumped storage hydros consume off peak power to pump water back to the storage dam for reuse. The water return pumps, primary transfer pumps and the transfer network pump stations will consume considerable electricity. Within Tibet, proposed electrification of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and its extensions, large-scale urbanisation, mining, industry and military facilities will create another major demand.

Downstream effects and water management problems

Filling this dam alone will take a decade, seriously reducing downstream flow. This massive dam requires a strict management regime to maintain critical water levels to meet the electricity demand. There is also the problem of conflicting agriculture water demand in India, Bangladesh and dependent areas in China. Emergency discharge would be disastrous if coinciding with the June to September monsoon season in India.

Environmental and humanitarian concerns

Tibet in general, is an arid area with little rainfall where glacial melt is the primary water source.

China's 33 per cent diversion uses 1990s glacial melt estimates before the serious effects of global warming became an issue. Recent studies by the China Academy of Sciences confirmed glacial regression in Tibet has exceeded their worst-case scenarios and at current rates, much of Tibet's glacial and surface waters will be lost in just a few decades.

China's 1990s calculations of China's annual demand of 200B m3 equated to 33 per cent of the flow at that time. Some forecasts warned global warming would trigger initial flow surges followed by drought, but failed to factor in a reduction in glacial recharge that will in fact reduce source flow reserves.

Extrapolating this data and using revised river flow, the projected 200B m3 will now be well in excess of the original 33 per cent portion of current flow. Based on Three Gorges, construction and reservoir charging will consume two of those decades, and at a time when glacial regression will be accelerating.

What happens downstream for the millions who are dependent on the mineral and silt rich waters of the Brahmaputra to revitalise their fields and ensure survival? This monster has a huge thirst just to meet China's water needs and that will sap energy from the Brahmaputra, especially on its final journey into the delta. As the energy dissipates, the current tidal surge will be enhanced, penetrating further and further upstream, with salt water destroying precious Bangladeshi farmland, inundating low-lying land, villages, and townships.

Beijing's denials

Despite denials from Beijing, State media continually refers to surveys and activity with oblique references to the Tsangpo Project.

Increasing reports to the contrary are coming out of China and Tibet. Scrutiny of the 100B Yuan capital works project for Tibet in the 11th 5-Year Plan exposes gaping holes. The 750M Yuan allocation for construction of the Medog highway suggests credence to the initiation of the Tsangpo Project.

State media has made numerous recent references to the 141km Bomi-Medog highway linking the lower Brahmaputra Valley with Tibet's main east-west highway 318. This is unusual expenditure considering Medog's population is less than 10,000 and mostly consists of Tibetans. Medog is 30km north of the disputed border with India and has a heavy, and reportedly increasing, military presence.

Access to this road has always been difficult. It is an unclassified road in "poor condition and a continual danger from landslide", but is in regular use by the military operating a wide range of vehicles.

Road works have been progressing at an unusual rate for some time and continue outside the normal safe construction period for this region resulting in the death of construction workers from landslides. Satellite images and reports portray a road unusual for such a low ethnic population in remote mountainous regions. Rather than the tortuous dirt switchbacks that are the norm, this new road will be bituminised, unusually wide and incorporates sweeping curves and tunnels. Such design features suggest a road for higher speeds and use by vehicles carrying heavy as well as long loads.

Roughly 20km north of Medog is the site for the proposed storage dam and new construction works in Medog suggest preparations for a major project or an unusual large military support base.

International rivers

China has so far dammed numerous trans-national rivers including Mekong, Sutlej, Indus, Ili and Ertix with plans for major dam cascades on the Salween and Irrawaddy as well as on major tributaries of the Mekong and Yangtze. These form part of the South to North water Diversion Project that is also part of the much more ambitious and contentious China's Water Strategy and Himalayan Strategy.

To avoid disputes over water rights and protect the economies and rights to water by dependent downstream populations, the United Nations promulgated the "UN Convention on Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses".

Despite considerable international pressure, China refuses to be a signatory, preferring instead to negotiate individual agreements with some, but not all neighbours.

Where to from here

Beijing proclaims that “China can feed itself in the next century”, yet the "problem" continually appears on NPC agendas as food imports, cooking oil and world grain prices escalate. By imposing price caps Beijing has only increased inflation.

Rapidly diminishing arable land (now below Beijing's set red line*) and water shortages combine with expanding desertification and increasing pollution to seriously question Beijing's confidence.

Those in the Zhongnanhai rely on grand projects to retain face and once on the drawing board a grand project must be executed regardless of consequences.

If China wants to be considered a responsible global citizen, it must accept the basic rights of people and especially those reliant on river waters, both within and beyond its borders. For those beyond, signing off on the "United Nations Convention on Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses" is only a start.

But the deliberate cold blooded intent to steal water to support uncontrolled and unsustainable development in north western China, that in turn will deny the basic human right of access to water to millions downstream on a trans-national river, is reckless in the extreme and poses the real possibility of China being held responsible for plunging Asia into the unthinkable - the first major international Water War.

*Note: It represents the absolute minimum area of arable land to be used for food production by 2010. Ministry of Land Resources recorded only 121.73M ha of arable land at the end of 2006, and at a time when China was currently losing 4,000km2 per year of arable land to desertification and non agricultural land use. Current opinion is that this Red Line has already been crossed.