Trump and Netanyahu are chasing an illusion in Iran

Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have launched a campaign against Iran with maximalist aims and minimalist means. They speak the language of regime change, but the political, military, and social preconditions are not present. The result will not be transformation in Tehran, but a high-risk spiral toward open-ended war that may engulf the region and end in strategic failure.

No alternative government in waiting

Successful regime change from without requires an organized, legitimate opposition capable of stepping into the vacuum. Iran has nothing of the kind. The opposition is fragmented, mistrustful, and poorly coordinated, especially between activists inside the country and the diaspora. There is no unified command, coherent program, or agreed transitional leadership around which a national movement can rally.

The 2025–26 protests, though large and courageous, lacked centralized leadership capable of translating street mobilization into an organized bid for power. Prominent figures such as Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi are in prison, while key exiled personalities like Reza Pahlavi are rejected and unable to command nationwide allegiance.

In this context, calls from Trump for Iranians to "rise up" are largely rhetorical. They seem to ignore the fact that authoritarian incumbents gain when contenders remain fragmented, as divisions and weakened coordination can strengthen the regime's endurance. Without a reliable alternative center of power, external pressure is more likely to produce internal repression than revolution.

Regime change without boots on the ground

The second illusion is that air and naval power alone can topple a hardened regime and usher in a new order. Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that even where regimes were rapidly overthrown, the absence of sustained, large-scale stabilization forces produced vacuums, insurgencies, and prolonged conflict, not liberal democracy aligned with Western preferences.

Trump does not intend to deploy the kind of ground forces and long-term peacebuilding apparatus required to manage a post–Islamic Republic transition. Tactical objectives-destroying nuclear and missile facilities, degrading command structures, killing senior commanders-have partly been achievable. But the larger question is whether regime change is realistically realizable without a serious post-conflict plan, a sustained presence, and adequate resources.

A system built to survive decapitation

Third, Trump and Netanyahu appear to assume that killing senior leaders or striking key nodes will fatally disorient the regime. Iran has spent years preparing to prove them wrong. Khamenei established a four-layered replacement framework for critical military and governmental posts, designed to prevent paralysis if top officials are killed in war. This structure empowers a narrow cadre of trusted officials with autonomous decision-making authority under wartime conditions or communications breakdowns, ensuring continuity of command and control.

The Islamic Republic's constitutional and clerical architecture was designed to outlast any single figure. Institutions such as the Assembly of Experts, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and an extensive internal security apparatus can collectively reconstitute leadership even after decapitation strikes. Succession planning aims to ensure that, even after the death of Khamenei, the system remains stable, operational, and viable. Decapitation may satisfy political appetites in Washington and Jerusalem, but it will not collapse the state.

The missing preconditions for regime change

Beyond these structural obstacles, core prerequisites of successful regime change are absent. Durable transitions require a broad, cross-class coalition that bridges urban middle classes, workers, and peripheral regions. There is little evidence of systematic IRGC or Basij fragmentation. The coercive organs of the state remain cohesive and effective, and its capacity for repression remains undiminished, sharply constraining the likelihood that calls to "rise up" will translate into regime change.

Despite a deep economic crisis, Tehran can still fund its security services and regional networks, preserving its ability to coerce at home and deter abroad. Historical cases suggest that regimes tend to fall not when they are merely weakened, but when ruling elites split. Current reporting emphasizes coordination rather than open fissures, and citizens are unlikely to strike unless they know that the prospect of success outweighs the risks.

Four strategic miscalculations

All this feeds into four interlocking miscalculations by Trump and Netanyahu.

First, they have misjudged the regime's resolve in the face of attack. Trump and Netanyahu calculated that calibrated strikes and coercive diplomacy would force Tehran to abandon its nuclear enrichment program, missile, and regional 'red lines.' Iranian leaders, however, have repeatedly stated a willingness to absorb significant punishment but will never capitulate.