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National Missile Defence: The Maginot Line of the 21st century

By Keir Semmens - posted Thursday, 18 December 2003


In 1930 André Maginot, the Minister of War, persuaded the French parliament to build a mighty barrier to resist attack by Germany. The project utilised the newest defense technology and was hugely expensive. And indeed it was so formidable that it was never breached.

Instead, in 1940 Hitler’s warriors simply outflanked it. The Maginot Line proved a white elephant that promoted a false sense of security but did little to protect the French people.

As Clausewitz warned: "If you entrench yourself behind strong fortifications, you compel the enemy to seek a solution elsewhere."

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Now the Howard government has committed Australia to participate in the development of the United States’ ballistic missile "shield". Assessment of this decision should be made against several critical criteria:

  1. Is the strategy feasible?
  2. Does the strategy counter the threat?
  3. Do the intended benefits justify the necessary expenditure?
  4. What consequences may result?
  5. How will it affect our strategic interests?
  6. Will it make Australia more secure?

1. Is the strategy feasible?

America’s National Missile Defence (NMD) Program proposes to detect and destroy a limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) following launch by a hostile power. The principal stated purpose is to protect against a nuclear attack by a "rogue" nation. The project is divided into three segments: boost, mid-course and terminal defense.

Australia intends to collaborate in the mid-course and terminal defence segments. Mid-course defence requires a land or sea-based interceptor missile to destroy the ICBM during early ascent through mid-flight, when it is travelling at its highest velocity approaching 6.5km per second. This is akin to hitting a bullet with another bullet. The interceptor missile would require high velocity and proximity to the ICBM flight path, coupled with a highly advanced tracking and directional guidance infrastructure to find its target.

Terminal defence aims to destroy the weapon during its descent. The Patriot missile batteries that gained attention during both Gulf Wars are an example of the kind of system designed to counter an inbound missile. Their limited success against slower and less advanced missiles, despite intensive expenditure on research and development, highlights the difficulties in designing a system capable of intercepting a missile.

Many knowledgeable critics of NMD argue that a foolproof system to intercept ICBMs is impossible. Deployment of multiple missiles, decoy warheads or firing from close range, such as from a merchant ship, are just some of the counter-measures available to an assailant to overwhelm any defences.

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The original Reagan missile defence program was quietly shelved when its architects realised that it could never protect against a comprehensive Soviet nuclear assault. Although it contributed to the demise of the Soviet regime, this was never its primary rationale.

We should not assume that simply investing enough will, technology and money will enable NMD to succeed.

2. Does the strategy counter the threat?

Notwithstanding the numerous technical challenges to overcome to achieve a secure NMD shield, the key question is whether it would prevent a nuclear attack. At best, it would fulfill its purpose of countering an ICBM.

However arms experts already acknowledge that the risk of attack by ICBM is low. Few countries possess the necessary technology. Terrorists certainly do not. And an ICBM can be readily traced to its launch source, thus enabling identification and response. Even rogue nations would beware the threat of catastrophic retaliation that would surely follow a nuclear attack by an ICBM.

Any prudent foe seeking to deliver a nuclear warhead would choose a less detectable delivery mechanism. Most likely this would be via cargo container or truck across largely porous borders. In this way it may be impossible even to ascertain who was responsible. NMD does nothing to guard against this threat.

3. Do the intended benefits justify the necessary expenditure?

A fully functioning NMD shield may provide limited defence from an inbound ICBM. However, given its limited utility and dubious reliability, it seems that the necessary investment could be better diverted to alternative defence priorities.

The Howard government has already made significant cutbacks in Australia’s Defence Forces. Now they have opted to spend money on a speculative and ill-judged adventure, without even revealing how much this may finally cost.

Australia would be better advised to invest scarce defence dollars in expanding its infantry strength, upgrading our border-defence capabilities and concentrating upon counter-terrorism and non-proliferation activities.

4. What consequences may result?

Despite American assurances that NMD is only intended to resist any ICBM threat from a "rogue" state, it would also pose a challenge to China. Present estimates suggest China possesses fewer than two dozen ICBMs capable of reaching the United States mainland. While this tally pales in comparison with the US nuclear arsenal, it represents a credible deterrent against a US attack. This is particularly sensitive given the ongoing tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

If China’s deterrent were neutralised by NMD, it would be vulnerable to nuclear blackmail in the event of a crisis. Since China will not permit this outcome, NMD might well trigger an arms race as China seeks to maintain the strategic status quo. At a minimum this would mean the development and deployment of several hundred more ICBMs. Japan and Taiwan would find this prospect most discomforting. It may lead India to respond with measures to counter China, since they are longstanding rivals. And Pakistan would not stand by while India marched ahead. In short, NMD could very well lead to a regional arms race.

Such an outcome would be strongly against Australia’s interests. Regional stability will not be improved by heightening the sense of insecurity felt by our neighbours. But it is just one of a range of unintended consequences that may result from the development of NMD.

5. How will it affect our strategic interests?

Several officials from neighbouring states have already expressed their disquiet at Australia’s mooted participation in NMD. This matter goes to the heart of whether we seek security from our region or within our region.

Notwithstanding the importance of traditional defence doctrines, the greatest immediate threat to Australia is posed by terrorists. We cannot defeat this threat without the cooperation of our neighbours. Participating in a project that increases mistrust and insecurity within the region will not help secure this cooperation.

Nor need a decision to oppose NMD rupture Australia’s relations with the United States, our principal ally. We share deep bonds forged over decades that allow us to disagree on principal when the need warrants. Australia did not support America’s request for assistance with testing of the MX missile during the Hawke government’s tenure and this did not damage our long-term relations.

The alliance remains the bedrock of Australia’s security and must be emphasised as such. Moreover, we can reiterate our support for the many other activities that contribute to our mutual security. But while we fully affirm America’s right and responsibility to protect its citizens, we can voice our belief that their efforts would be better directed elsewhere.

6. Will it make Australia more secure?

In the limited event of an ICBM attack upon Australia or one of our allies, a functioning NMD shield would benefit Australia’s interests. But against this must be balanced the considerable downsides that NMD would impose.

National Missile Defence is the Maginot Line of the 21st Century. It provides a security façade without genuine substance. Australia’s decision to join NMD does not best serve our national interests. There are solid strategic and security arguments to oppose this plan and they should be made.

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About the Author

Keir Semmens is an investment banker and longstanding member of the Australian Labor Party.

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