Lessons From East Timor: what value Australia’s intelligence apparatus?

And third, was appropriate intelligence available but not passed on to the government in the knowledge that it would be regarded as unpalatable and hence not be acted upon?

Here are some of Mr Downer’s statements on the matter.

In a recent article in The Age (July 12, 2008), he noted that in 1999, “it was widely known that elements of the Indonesian military were behind the violent militia activity in East Timor”.

He added that those elements were defying the orders of Jakarta and suggested it was highly unlikely that then President Habibie sanctioned the violence. Nevertheless, he felt that General Wiranto, the head of the military, was aware of it, though “I suspect he felt powerless to stop it on the grounds that there were significant elements of the TNI that felt bitter and vengeful towards the East Timorese”.

The day before, on July 11, Mr Downer told ABC Radio (see Bruce Haigh’s article, “We need to clarify Timor role”, in On Line Opinion, July 23) that in contrast to the common image of Wiranto as a “big strong man, he didn’t really have the strength within the Indonesian military to close it down”.

Surely, if Mr Downer and his government colleagues believed this, they should have moved quickly to bring in an international peacekeeping force to guard against carnage in East Timor. Instead, this was resisted at every turn, despite the fact that Australian missionaries, aid workers and media reporters were regularly informing us of reality on the ground there.

Along the way, in June 1999, the Australian Government’s failure to pass on to its American allies an accurate picture of the trouble brewing in East Timor aroused US suspicions and resulted in tragedy for one unfortunate Australian caught up in the deception.

Former Army lieutenant-colonel Mervyn Jenkins, a widely respected expert in electronic warfare, was working in the Australian Embassy in Washington where his role was to pass on intelligence to the Americans. In order to protect the long-term relationship with this key ally, he passed on both a true portrayal of reality in Indonesia and East Timor along with the lesser version that Canberra required him to supply. In the intelligence partnership that Australia belongs to, along with the US, the UK and others, lying is considered a cardinal sin. When Canberra discovered what Jenkins was doing he was so badly treated by the Australian Government that he committed suicide on his 48th birthday. Those responsible for this heinous act have never been called to account.

When a government puts spin on intelligence it is telling the agencies that it prefers to tailor its own reality. The message is clear to everyone that those who deliver the goods will be favoured and those who remain loyal to the principles that underpin the profession won’t. In effect, promotion is on the line, if not also your career. There are always those in the intelligence community who will jump at the opportunity to further their personal cause.

Sending the message that regime survival is more important than the truth is one of the most callous ways of politicising the machinery of government.

While President Yudhoyono’s acknowledgement of wrongs that were done - genteel and inadequate as it might be - is one small step on Indonesia’s road to democracy, there’s also a salutary warning in it for us. That is that for decent men and women in our intelligence agencies to do their job confidently and securely, watching and listening on our behalf, they need us to bother to stay awake while they’re doing it. If we want to recruit quality people of integrity into the system we need to show them that we care how they’re treated.

Democracy should never be taken for granted.