Still struggling for independence: elections in Timor Leste

Independence is not an end, it is the beginning of self rule. Kofi Annan, May 2002.

Australian representations of elections in Timor Leste have reflected the wishful thinking of an elite. Media coverage of the Presidential elections focused almost exclusively on the pro-Australian candidate, Jose Ramos Horta, and commentaries over a future government keenly search for a Xanana-led coalition that might upset the currently Fretilin dominated parliament.

The fact that Francisco (“Lu Olo”) Guterres, the man who won the first Presidential round, was not seriously profiled by any Australian media outlet should give us pause to reflect on the quality of information provided. To win the first round while opposed by the incumbent president, the incumbent prime minster, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the Australian elite is quite an achievement. It shows that Fretilin as a force for independence still resonates strongly with the East Timorese people.

There was a great deal of media speculation over possible election fraud, pointing a finger at Fretilin. This was remarkable given the high level of international observers and the open anti-Fretilin bias of the electoral authority. Electoral chief and Catholic Church representative Martinho Gusmao publicly endorsed opposition leader Fernando Araujo before the election, then made a false claim that votes in pro-Fretilin Baucau were massively over-subscribed. European Union observers contradicted him.

What of Lu Olo? He was a guerilla leader for the entire resistance period, Speaker of Parliament for over five years and remains a loyal member of Fretilin. Mari Alkatiri, the former prime minister reviled by the Australian media, is still General Secretary of the party. So while the coup attempt and foreign intervention have undoubtedly shaken confidence in Fretilin, the first round has demonstrated that no other party in Timor Leste has anything close to its support.

Recall that an alliance of sorts was formed at the time of the first Presidential election of April 2002, where Fretilin agreed to support Xanana Gusmao, provided that he ran as an independent. Xanana’s only opposition was Francisco Xavier do Amaral from the ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association). Fretilin had already gained an outright majority in the August 2001 elections for a constituent assembly, which went on to become the nation’s first parliament.

Prior to the 2006 crisis, a major political achievement was the effective combination of the strategic vision of Alkatiri’s Fretilin, the charisma of Xanana and the diplomacy of Ramos Horta. Despite a tiny budget (increasing in 2007, with oil revenue) they began the institutions of a modern state, expanded education, rehabilitated their rice fields, developed a major health program and clawed back several billion dollars in oil and gas revenue from the Howard Government.

Alkatiri attracted most Australian hostility, particularly over the protracted oil and gas talks. Ramos Horta was the weak link. I have detailed elsewhere (Timor Leste: the Second Australian Intervention) how he attempted three compromises, all of which would have pleased Howard and Downer but resulted in less revenue for his country. Little wonder he emerged as the Australian favourite.

Xanana maintained an aloofness from party politics, a stance which aided his major political project of reconciliation. He forgave the Indonesian generals (despite a lack of repentance on their side) and attempted to reintegrate former militia members into local communities.

However this aloofness evaporated in the crisis, as Xanana indirectly supported coup leader Alfredo Reinado and bitterly attacked Fretilin. As president he demanded the resignation of Mari Alkatiri, using a video copy of a notorious ABC program which had relied on the word of one of Reinado’s allies to accuse Alkatiri of arming a “hit squad” to kill his political opponents, and of having already murdered a number of them. A UN investigation into the crisis (Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste (PDF 439KB)) later discredited this story.

The Australian media, however, clings to the “hit squad” theory, gaining some comfort from the conviction of Alkatiri ally and former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato for the offence of distributing police weapons to civilians. Lobato, appealing his conviction, maintains these acts were justified during a coup attempt, when the police force had disintegrated.

With coup leader Reinado still at large, but apparently no longer considered a political asset or a threat by either Xanana or the Australians, the politics of Timor Leste seem to have returned to a somewhat more “normal” footing. But it is a political process badly damaged by violence, dislocation and mistrust.

Ramos Horta may still win the Presidency from Lu Olo in the second round. However this depends more on voter perceptions than on the small opposition parties’ ability to deliver “blocs” of votes, as in a more class-based party system. Ramos Horta has international recognition but Lu Olo is the “grassroots” candidate.

Many of the epithets thrown at Mari Alkatiri - that he was arrogant and an exile during the struggle - now apply to Ramos Horta, not Lu Olo. In any case, a Ramos Horta presidency would not be a major barrier to a Fretilin-led government. East Timorese are used to having a figurehead, non-Fretilin president, and a Fretilin government.

Xanana Gusmao’s descent from the presidency to party politics is a far more uncertain path. His role in the crisis and his open anti-Fretilin hostility has damaged his own standing, as well as that of Fretilin. After his passive support for the coup, much of the army leadership will not trust him. His attempt to recreate a “CNRT” coalition, using the initials of the earlier coalition which included Fretilin, is a gamble which depends upon cobbling together a number of small parties whose only common theme is opposition to Fretilin.

On the other side, Fretilin will have suffered from their apparent inability to guarantee stability and the persistent attempts to blame the government for the coup. Fretilin may not be able to regain the outright parliamentary majority it has held since 2001. On the other hand, the Presidential first round tells us Fretilin is still the major political force in the country. Its vote could still exceed 40 per cent in the parliamentary elections. The competition would then be between a Fretilin-led coalition and a less coherent Xanana-led coalition.

Personalities apart, neither Xanana nor Ramos Horta offer much of a strategic alternative to Fretilin. Of course, both participated in many of the Fretilin-led government’s campaigns, including those which sought to bring in new development partners (for example, China for oil and gas and Cuba for health).

Some differences have emerged. Ramos Horta has said he favours “greater privileges” for foreign investors, and recently proposed a radical reduction in business taxes and tariffs. This would, however, increase government reliance on oil and gas revenues. Xanana’s one recent suggestion has been to break the controlled release of revenue from the Petroleum Fund. So the main policy departure of a Ramos Horta-Xanana-led coalition would seem to be spending up the oil wealth faster.

Fretilin, for its part, has an experienced group of ministers, including Deputy Prime Minister Estanislau da Silva, several senior women ministers including Maria Boavida and Ana Pessoa, a strong party machine, widespead membership and has shown its skills in coalition building. Even with an absolute parliamentary majority, Fretilin recruited independent MPs, such as Health Minister (now Deputy PM) Rui Araujo, Finance Minister Fernanda Borges, Education Minister Armindo Maia, Labor Minister Arsénio Bano and Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta into the government.

A Fretilin-led coalition government thus seems a more likely outcome of the coming parliamentary elections than a Xanana-led coalition. The return of Mari Alkatiri as prime minister is also possible. Just how the constellation of forces that deposed Alkatiri would react to this is not clear. Expectations have been raised by the intervention and anti-Fretilin push. In particular, it seems unlikely that Xanana imagines he is trading in his presidency to become opposition leader.