Donor fatigue a problem for Pakistan

Pakistan - October 2005: there were 75,000 killed, 140,000 injured and an affected area of over 30,000 square kilometres in the remote and inaccessible Himalaya. A disaster on a scale to attract attention? A disaster on a comparable scale to the Boxing Day tsunami.

Add the huge number of children killed, the 3.5 million left homeless and the harshness of a Himalayan winter bearing down. Pathos, drama and a timeline. Enough to attract Brad and Angelina to Muzaffarabad and get me an unusual afternoon tea invitation.

Tension? Well the setting is bordered on one side by the Line of Control (LOC) between Pakistan and Indian-administered Kashmir and on the other by the tribal areas of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Afghanistan.

The under-funded flash appeal suggests it was not enough to capture the imagination of the general public or the donors. While under-funding of disasters is nothing new (consider the Sudan, Niger, the DRC, well most of Africa really) why did we choose to throw endless dollars at the tsunami and not at the Pakistan earthquake?

Some of the answers are obvious: donor fatigue (tsunami, Katrina, Niger and Pakistan all in 12 months); and a lack of western affinity with Pakistan (another way of alluding to the terrorist associations in many people’s minds) compared to the beach playgrounds of Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka. It sounds like I'm blaming the unidentifiable "them"?

What interests me is where did the humanitarian community go wrong in their efforts to attract support? We were all slow in determining the scale and requirements of the emergency. The original flash appeal on October 14 called for $311 million which was raised to $550 million in a revised appeal on October 26.

We were slow to convince donors that we could effectively and efficiently manage the disaster leading to an infuriating loop: no money; can't do the job; not doing the job; don’t get money.

Sitting in a tent in Muzaffarabad, at the epicentre of the earthquake, and being part of the process to convince donors we could do the job was an interesting experience. That it could come down to one-on-one conversations where an individual's competence would seem to speak for the whole of the UN is not a sustainable model.

We didn't sell the story: was this poor PR or was it a story the world wasn't interested in hearing? Did we not want to tell how well the military had done, afraid of questions about the irrelevance of the humanitarians? The success story of the operation was the job done by the Pakistan military: not a classically user-friendly face of humanitarianism and one that raises questions about the need for, and role of, the international humanitarian community. Was it the bad press about other aspects of the UN’s work that was just too hard to compete against?

John Dauth, Australia's former ambassador to the UN, made a point of acknowledging the work of programs like the WFP (World Food Program) in saving millions of lives, even as he slammed the effectiveness and integrity of the UN as a whole. Even if you have no faith in the other functions of the UN - and I am idealistic enough and naive enough to believe we need the UN and can make it work - the lives saved every year are irrefutable evidence that we must ensure the survival of the relief arm.

On the ground how did this affect the operation, and more importantly the people? Am I forgetting that it's the human face that sells a disaster?

Well, the operation was not affected as badly as we all feared would have to be the honest answer. But this has more to do with the amount Pakistan was able to do for itself then anything else.

That said, the lack of funds and the pace with which they came in, did slow down the operation. It affected how quickly people were reached, how quickly relief supplies were delivered, but more important, it affected the efficiency of the operation. Delayed funds early on meant a delay and shortage of air assets (helicopters).

The focus tends always be on immediate needs, but this results in a less efficient overall response. Donors' criticisms generally focus on information management.

So with limited funding, do you address the developing cholera outbreak, NFI (non food items) tracking, food needs, or systematic assessments?

Now, six months since the earthquake, the problem of a lack of funds is again kicking in. Air assets are being scaled down just at a time when increased landslides triggered by melting snow and increased rain are reducing road access. People will not go back to their villages to rebuild their homes and lives if they fear being cut off without food or medical support.

As the relief phase moves into rehabilitation and recovery, what has been achieved? There have been 425,000 emergency shelters built; 520,000 tents distributed; and 350,000 children immunised against measles. The population has survived the winter with fewer deaths from cold than were recorded last year.

The work of rebuilding has only just begun. Entire cities need to be rebuilt and communities housed, fed and generally supported as this takes place. The funding for reconstruction is much more secure than it was for the relief phase, the bridge between the two is the potential weakness now.

The point of difference in this operation is that about 80 per cent of the aid was delivered by the Pakistan military. It has been called "the most successful example of civil and military co-operation anywhere, anytime, ever". Although they could not have achieved this without the skills, guidance, knowledge and particularly the helicopter support of the humanitarian community, the efforts of the Pakistani military are the real story of this disaster.

The lack of financial support for this emergency was made up for by the ability of the Pakistan military. When reviewing the resourcing and positive outcomes, it must be remembered that few countries would be able to match this effort. Both the humanitarian and donor communities must learn and act on the lessons learnt in Pakistan.