Reconstituting the United Nations for collective security – we need a popular campaign!

I became interested in this question a couple of years ago and subsequently had two letters on the subject published in the mainstream press. It struck me then - and still does - as an urgently needed reform, namely: limitation or abolition of the veto power of the 'Permanent Five' on the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). While researching the topic, I was surprised to discover the extent of opposition among UN member states to the veto power enjoyed by the P5 on the Security Council.

This article is intended to stimulate discussion. I would welcome feedback that might help me strengthen it before submitting it to mainstream newspapers as a feature article.

Is the proposal realistic? One of my favourite slogans from the Paris uprising of 1968 was: 'Be realistic - demand the impossible!' Yet I do not believe it is impossible to create a United Nations genuinely founded on collective security, or to reform it so that it possesses its own international armed force capable of rapid deployment. If it is impossible, then human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson's call for a 'union of democratic states' might be a practicable alternative.

The principal obstacles are the permanent members that benefit most from the present arrangements - particularly Russia, China and the United States - together with the governments and political forces that defend or excuse their use of the veto.

I remember when protests against the US war in Vietnam consisted of small rallies. They eventually grew into enormous marches involving tens of thousands of people in Australia's capital cities. Every broad movement begins by raising an issue that has previously been regarded as unrealistic or impossible.

A starting point today would be to build a broad-based campaign demanding reforms to the UN Charter. These should call for a prohibition on the use of the veto in cases involving genocide, mass atrocities or clear acts of aggression; prevention of a party to a conflict from voting on enforcement measures concerning its own conduct; and provision for a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly to override a Security Council veto.

The United Nations arose from the failure of the League of Nations, the first great experiment in collective security.The League's principle was bold - aggression against one member concerned them all - but its machinery was weak. The United States never joined; colonial rule excluded much of humanity; major decisions generally required unanimity; and sanctions or military action depended on governments choosing to act. When they did not, the League could neither stop aggression nor prevent another world war.

The UN's founders sought broader membership, binding decisions and enforceable peace, but learned the lesson only halfway. Five permanent members received the veto, while the military agreements envisaged by the Charter were never concluded. East Timor shows what decisive UN-authorised action can achieve; Palestine, Sudan, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Syria show the cost of paralysis. The remedy is veto reform and an accountable international force able to act promptly against aggression and mass atrocities.

East Timor and the power to act

East Timor shows what the United Nations can achieve. After a 78.5 per cent vote for independence in the UN-supervised ballot of 30 August 1999, pro-integration militias, backed by elements of Indonesian security forces, unleashed killing, forced displacement and destruction. On 15 September, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1264 under Chapter VII. It authorised the International Force for East Timor, INTERFET, to use all necessary measures to restore peace and security, protect the UN mission and facilitate humanitarian assistance. An Australian-led force began deploying five days later. Violence subsided, displaced people began returning, and INTERFET handed responsibility to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, established by Resolution 1272. Timor-Leste became independent in May 2002.

East Timor was a rare success for collective security. It combined lawful authority, regional leadership, international troops, a clear mandate and a political end point. Yet it also exposed the weakness of the system. INTERFET was not a standing UN force and did not deploy automatically. Action depended on unanimous agreement among the permanent members, Indonesian consent, Australian leadership and national contingents assembled after the crisis had already caused enormous suffering. East Timor therefore offers both proof and warning. International force can halt organised violence and protect self-determination, but the present UN can act decisively only when powerful states permit it and capable government volunteers to carry the burden, as the Australian government did under Prime Minister John Howard. (Australia contributed 5,500 troops – almost half of the total INTERFET). A reformed United Nations should make such capacity permanent, impartial and promptly available.

The need for fundamental reform

The United Nations remains important, but it cannot reliably fulfil its central purpose of maintaining international peace through collective action. The Charter prohibits aggressive war, authorises binding Security Council decisions and envisages economic and military enforcement. Yet the system was never completed. The veto allows any one of five permanent members to prevent action, including when that state or a close ally is involved. The military agreements anticipated by Article 43 were never concluded. The UN consequently possesses extensive legal authority without dependable means of enforcement. Real collective security requires equal rules, representative decisions that no single power can obstruct, and a permanent international capacity able to respond promptly to aggression and mass atrocities. If such changes prove impossible within the present Charter, the longer term aim should be a reconstituted United Nations or a broadly supported successor organisation that preserves the UN's valuable agencies and accumulated law while correcting its constitutional defects.

The unfinished system of 1945

Under Chapter VII, the Security Council can identify threats to peace, impose sanctions and authorise military action. Articles 43 to 47 envisaged forces designated in advance, immediately available air contingents, agreed command arrangements and a Military Staff Committee^. Cold War disagreements between the United States and Soviet Union over force size, contributions, bases, access and command prevented the required agreements. The UN instead became dependent on peacekeeping and temporary coalitions. Peacekeeping can monitor ceasefires and support political settlements with the parties' consent, but it differs from collective enforcement against an aggressor determined to continue fighting. Coalitions authorised to use force remain controlled by participating governments, producing selective intervention, double standards and suspicion that international law serves powerful states.