From confrontation to cooperation

Firstly, I referred to the Organisation's founding logic: the OSCE was born as a space of dialogue among enemies, originally between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, facilitated by neutral and non-aligned states during the Cold War. That underlying function remains intact and available to any state that wishes to use it, including on matters as consequential as the long-term security architecture of post-conflict Ukraine, the future of EU-Russia, and the security guarantees that might allow Ukraine to feel secure in a future settlement.

Secondly, I identified the deficiency not in the instrument but in its use. The space is there, it can be used, but we don't have the kind of wise leadership, in a way, that is needed and willing to use it. I pointed specifically at the European Union, which holds a majority of OSCE member states but has not taken the lead in using the Organisation's distinctly inclusive framework; a framework in which Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and effectively all European states, including a number of Central Asian former Soviet states, sit together as partners.

Thirdly, I pointed to the same polarization dynamic discussed earlier, now operating inside the European Union itself, compounded by a broader international climate in which policies of sanction are prevailing over policies of engagement, even less if the engagement would have to be among enemies. A not well-known fact, technical cooperation has often persisted even where high-level political dialogue collapses entirely. I experienced this presenting the OSCE's small arms work to Asian partners through the ASEAN Regional Forum despite political objections to the interaction between the two Organizations, showcasing OSCE engagement in Europe in the context of Korean reunification efforts, or promoting the work on controversial histories in relation to antagonistic historical narratives in the Western Balkans, Ukraine or the Baltic region. This work is evidence that there remains space for leadership beyond what states are currently prepared to offer.

Successive UN Secretaries General also saw the importance of investing in multilateral instruments at the regional level – a policy of revitalization of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. An efficient and well coordinated web of regional organizations operating autonomously but under an overall UN umbrella to ensure that the key principles of the Charter are upheld also in the context of very different and specific regional dynamics, perspectives and requirements, might prove to be the most effective way forward.

The Iran crisis: toward a Gulf (or West Asia) dialogue?

It would seem that the proposed Muscat/Oman Process, which has been in diplomatic circulation since June through the Group of Friends of the Process, has also found resonance in Muscat itself: Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi said later in July that all eight countries on the Gulf littoral – Oman and the five other GCC members, plus Iran and Iraq – should be involved in designing a new regional security arrangement, while calling for greater regional responsibility for security and a recalibration of relationships with major external powers.

An example of the importance of a renewed investment on multilateralism at the regional/sub-regional level could be provided by recent developments in the extended Gulf region. While a number of Gulf countries have developed a successful process of cooperation through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), this remains a process of interaction between largely like-minded countries, and not one of inclusive engagement among all regional actors with different political, economic, and security perceptions and objectives. The conflict between Iran and Iranian-backed groups with Israel and the US has prompted talks between GCC members, Pakistan and Turkey to strengthen more independent regional defence capabilities. However, this remains a one-sided effort, while an inclusive framework for possible engagement among all relevant regional actors is still missing. The centrality of the principle of freedom of navigation, which should apply also to the Strait of Hormuz, could be a key point in this dialogue, which should bring together actors that, beyond their historic differences and disagreements, have common interests in terms of economic development, security and stability of the region.

The OSCE model of a framework for dialogue and cooperation among enemies could come useful in this regard – as argued by the Group of Friends for some time. Oman, which has been having conversations with Iran on the sensitive issue of navigation through Hormuz, would be best placed to take the lead in establishing an inclusive framework for dialogue on a broader range of issues of concern to regional actors.

The core group could be the GCC6 plus Iran, but then it would be up to the core group to decide which other regional or global actors could be involved, at what level and with what status. The OSCE, once again, could serve as a model – some of its members have been part of certain arms control negotiations, others have not. Some countries enjoy the status of partners and have access to only some of the activities of the Organization. The UN also offers the model of observer status. In any case, any such process should be initiated by the states of the region themselves, who would determine the agenda and the degree of institutionalisation of the process.

The UNGA might be kept informed of any progress and should be encouraged to recognise the usefulness of subregional efforts aimed at promoting peace and security in line with Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Agenda.