Will the Xi Jinping era come to a quiet end?

The so-called "Beidaihe Conference" does not actually exist, because it is not listed on the CCP's regular meeting agenda. In Beidaihe there are only irregular, closed-door consultations. It is widely believed that this year's Beidaihe talks will decisively influence the CCP's Fourth Plenary Session scheduled for October, which in turn will shape the 21st Party Congress. I have long argued this point: major CCP meetings are usually pre-arranged, with key decisions already negotiated within the top leadership. These are then rubber-stamped through routine meetings by "hand-raising machines" (party delegates, NPC deputies, or CPPCC members) to provide procedural legitimacy, before being announced to the party and the public.

The central question this time is: will the Beidaihe talks quietly bring an end to the Xi Jinping era? That is the biggest point of attention.

This year's closed-door talks at Beidaihe are a continuation of last year's. The political upheaval that occurred during the Third Plenary Session last year was linked to the military's "quasi-mutiny." Without the military emerging as an independent force at a critical historical moment, neither the extraordinary political anomalies of the past year nor the flood of rumors would have been possible. These are not mere rumors; they have been reported by major international media outlets and even, in some form, indirectly confirmed by senior US officials. For example, Voice of America reported in 2024 that during his visit to Beijing on August 29, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the CCP's Central Military Commission. Ordinarily, the US National Security Advisor should have met with China's Minister of Defense; the meeting with Zhang Youxia was clearly an extraordinary arrangement, reflecting Washington's awareness that Zhang held real authority over the Chinese military and was therefore the key figure to engage with.

When rumors surrounding Zhang Youxia were swirling, it would have been very easy for relevant CCP departments to dispel them or set the record straight. All that was needed was for Zhang to publish a pledge of loyalty to Xi in the PLA Daily. Clearly, that did not happen. Since the latter half of last year, the PLA Daily has not only stopped promoting the system of "the Chairman of the CMC taking full responsibility," but has also ceased urging the military to "be good fighters for Chairman Xi." Instead, a series of declarative commentaries have been published, focusing on party principles, collective leadership, and intra-party democracy. Everyone understands that the military is an institution where all commands must be obeyed. Thus, when the PLA Daily gives high-profile emphasis to "democratic centralism," it is not really addressing the military about democracy - it is sending a message directed at the Party's central leadership.

Therefore, a "mutiny" - that is, an abnormal shift within the military - has already taken place. How it will affect the CCP's political landscape, or more precisely, how it will shape the political struggles during the Beidaihe talks, will determine the agenda of the Fourth Plenary Session and may even decisively influence the selection of top leaders at the 21st Party Congress.

Without a mutiny or quasi-mutiny (not aimed at overthrowing the regime, but at altering the structure of personal dictatorship), there would be no force within the system capable of shaking Xi Jinping's personal autocracy, which has already entrenched itself through constitutional amendments and the establishment of a model of lifelong rule. It is precisely because the military has emerged as an independent force that the Party elders have re-entered the stage, creating a balance of political power against Xi Jinping's faction.

"Ending the Xi era" has become a consensus among the party, government, and military

First, Xi Jinping brought an end to the Reform and Opening-up era. At the level of national strategy, he abandoned Deng Xiaoping's principle of "keeping a low profile while biding time," pushing China into heightened tensions with the United States and the West, to the point where the US now classifies China among its adversaries. The international political and economic environment has become more hostile than ever.

Second, Xi has moved politically in the opposite direction of political reform. The pragmatic arrangements of the Deng era - such as the "seven up, eight down" retirement norm, the practice of designating successors across generations, and the system of limited terms - have all been abandoned. Through constitutional amendments, Xi enabled indefinite re-election, making lifelong rule possible. The Party now fears the return of Cultural Revolution–style politics. Such personalist dictatorship serves only the ruler's supremacy while bringing countless harms, and no benefits, to the Party, the state, and the people.

Third, Xi's massive investments in the "Belt and Road Initiative," the construction of Xiong'an New Area, and similar projects have pushed China's economy into a deep crisis. Today the crisis has erupted on an unprecedented scale: the economic achievements of Reform and Opening-up have been dramatically eroded, with many middle-class families finding their homes turned into negative assets, sliding back into poverty. Should Xi Jinping bear responsibility for this?

Here, the most crucial question is: why can the military no longer tolerate Xi Jinping's personalist dictatorship?

Unlike Mao Zedong, Xi Jinping has not built up decades of entrenched authority within the military. Mao, over nearly half a century, had personally appointed virtually all senior commanders, and from the Yan'an era onward was elevated through the "Red Sun" cult of personality. Thus, no matter what political campaigns he launched, the military generally remained loyal. Even so, Lin Liguo once plotted the "Project 571" coup plan - though the mutiny ultimately failed.

Xi, by contrast, gained his initial military authority through the support of "princeling" figures within the army. Liu Yuan, Liu Yazhou, and Zhang Youxia were all powerful backers who helped propel Xi to the top. But once Xi consolidated power, he inevitably moved to monopolize control over the military. As a result, Liu Yuan was sidelined, Liu Yazhou was imprisoned, and Zhang Youxia's faction inevitably faced existential risk. While Zhang himself might, like Liu Yuan, have been quietly marginalized, his associates within the military were far more likely to be subjected to a sweeping purge.