Focus on the consultative process, not particular republican models

Model Four - People Elect the President:

A direct-election model where any eligible citizen with the required number of signatures can be a candidate for Head of State. This is the most open and democratic of the ARM’s proposed models and would offer the people a direct vote for their Head of State.

Model Five - People Elect From Parliament's List:

With this direct-election model, the parliament approves a short list of candidates by a two-thirds majority. This seeks to balance the principle of direct election with a desire to have a non-party political figure as Head of State.

While the models outlined by the ARM represent the broad range of republican opinion, they are by no means the be-all and end-all, a fact the ARM happily acknowledges. A number of alternative workable models have been devised by other individuals and republican groups.

Despite all this talk of models, however, the ARM's attention remains steadfastly focussed on the process for moving towards an Australian republic. This is the second, and arguably more important, part of the Senate Committee's current Inquiry.

The ARM  advocates a three-plebiscite process: first, a plebiscite on the threshold question of whether Australia should become a republic; a second plebiscite asking Australians their preferred model and a third asking Australians to choose the title of the Head of State. A fully elected Convention would then draft the model, according to the plebiscite results, to be put to the Australian people in a referendum.

This approach offers ongoing public consultation that allows the Australian people to decide what kind of republic they want. This is ultimately the best way to deliver constitutional change.

Our process is similar to that advocated by Opposition Leader Mark Latham., although the ARM proposes a third plebiscite on the title of the new Head of State, and we strongly advocate an elected Constitutional Convention to work through the details of the final model.

Rather than trying to find a middle ground between republican models, the process for constitutional reform provides the key to the republican impasse that Van Onselen and Errington have highlighted. It forces monarchists to defend the current system in the first plebiscite (an embarrassment they managed to avoid in 1999). The second plebiscite gives direct-electionists and minimalist republicans the opportunity to explain and promote their republican models and provides legitimacy to the whole debate. Ultimately the Australian people decide what kind of republic they want; and both direct-electionists and minimalist republicans get a fair shot at persuading their fellow Australians to their way of thinking.