Wither the Liberals, the Nationals and the Coalition

The problem with Birmingham's progressive agenda is it does not gel with many of the Liberal Party's voters, the party's historical stance on issues and seems to just be just emulation of the Labor Party's views rather than differentiation. Moreover, it has so far hardly been a vote winner for the Liberals as Birmingham would know from the Liberal Party's failures in his home state and the fall after one term of the progressive Liberal Marshall Government this year.

Of course, these sorts of debates often erupt when the Liberals lose office. It occurred following the Whitlam Labor 1972 victory and the struggle between moderate Billy Snedden and the more strident and conservative Malcolm Fraser. It was repeated in the progressive Peacock and reformer Howard leadership tussles between 1983-96. Over and over again, it has been the Liberals who projected a distinct and different policy agenda to the Labor opposition who have won office resoundingly.

The issue is whether the fissures which the recent election loss have so exposed, can be contained within the Liberal Party's current 'broad church' of agreed beliefs and values, while allowing the exploration and accommodation of new views? Of course, if the coalition model of political success is to continue, any broadening of the Liberal 'creed' must take into account the sensitivities of the National Party.

If this is too restrictive, then as Birmingham has suggested, the two parties should go their own separate ways while in opposition. They can then be free to adjust their preferred policy directions, maximise their political appeal and come together at a later date. Remember after the Coalition lost the 1972 election, the National Party did just that. It decided not to be in coalition with the Liberals when in opposition.

The Nationals wanted independence to broaden their policy range and electoral appeal, even trying other possible liaisons (eg with the Democratic Labor Party). They were not eager to re-join the coalition until the Liberal Party "knows where it is going and what it stands for." The separation did not last as mutual political interest soon revived the coalition. Given subsequent coalition electoral success in 1975, no adverse political harm was caused by these party games.

So, perhaps a 'trial separation' might be an appropriate model for the current Liberal and National parties to test. After all, the coalition has long been seen as more a 'marriage of convenience' than an alliance of really like-minded parties seeking the same policy goals and imbued with the same aspirations. As before, the separation could be short-lived. Or it might lead to a more major restructuring of the non-Labor parties, that could leave them in opposition forever, or an amalgamation of the parties that has long been proposed, but never achieved nationally.