Can government learn from history?

The United States has lost in Afghanistan. Some of us warned about the risks of the US operation right from the start two decades ago.

Instead of vindicating our views, I want to argue for a radical proposal: the need for government to learn from its mistakes. This is not the usual "applied history" approach, namely, that there are "lessons" to be learned from history, such as the Graham Allison best-seller on the Thucydides Trap, which is warning about a risk of a US-China war based on case studies drawn from the last five centuries.

Instead, I would like to propose that parliament requires government to have a mechanism to study its own successes and failures. This would help (to use modern management jargon) to turn government into a "learning organization".

In societies where people can vote freely, there is a decline in voter participation. People are voting more but enjoying it less. There is a reduced confidence in government. Government (irrespective of political party) just seems to lurch from one problem to another – and sometimes even repeating the same errors.

Individual humans can often learn from their mistakes, such as stopping smoking. Why can't government?

The US Army, following on from some corporations, has an "after action review" (AAR) process. There should be a similar one within government.

The AAR deals with four questions:

- what was expected to happen?

- why actually occurred?

- what went well and why?

- what can be improved and how?

The AAR reveals four factors: what was the task, why was the task important, what was the intention behind operation, and was there a clear end?

It is not a blaming exercise, designed to find scapegoats. It is not targeted at particular individuals. It is a way of assessing just how well a government actually operates – rather than just relying on the claims made by the government spin doctors.

The emphasis is on improving future performance. Therefore, the intention is not simply to produce a report that will gather dust on the shelves. There has to be follow through. It is an opportunity for learning.

A parliamentary enquiry could not be trusted to do this work. That is too much like asking politicians to mark their own homework. I used to give evidence to such parliamentary enquiries (I now recognize them as a waste of time) and they soon descend into party political skirmishes or they just belittle the witnesses.

There has to be an external body to do the assessment. The body would also monitor the fate of its findings and recommendations.

It may well be that the recommendations cannot be made automatically binding on a government – because of the sovereignty of parliament doctrine – but it stays around as a learning tool. If a government decided not to implement the recommendations, then it would need to explain its reasoning.

I realize that I am sounding hopelessly optimistic about politicians and bureaucrats behaving in a rational manner, that they actually do want to learn from their actions. This proposal is introducing rationality into a process marked – if not marred – by passion, personal ambition, and short-term thinking.

However, the proposal is triggered by a growing sense of disillusionment with modern democratic government. I am troubled by the number of people who have contempt for the modern parliamentary/ congressional system and think that we should have some form of benevolent dictatorship.

China, for example, is often seen as having a more efficient form of government. Its infrastructure and telecommunications are seen as being better than what the tired old western democracies can produce.

If government knew beforehand it would be subject to the AAR, it would encourage more reflection, and perhaps a greater willingness to listen to alternative voices – just to make sure that it is not making an error of judgment.

A Before Action Review (BAR) would encourage a rational dispassionate consideration of such matters as: what are the intended results, what are the potential challenges, what have previous AARs shown in similar situations, and why should we think that we could be any more successful this time?

A 2001 BAR in Afghanistan would have made a classic case study. After all, the failures of the British in the 19^th century (twice) and the Soviet Union in the 1980s had shown how risky foreign military interventions could be in Afghanistan. It would have encouraged the US and its allies to think more creatively about apprehending Osama bin Laden.

For example, my proposal at the time was a reward of a US$500million dollars and the promise of residency anywhere overseas for anyone – such as the Russian or Tajik mafia – who could capture bin Laden and bring him before an international criminal court. This would have been a lot cheaper than the two decades of fruitless fighting that we have endured.

We need government to be more creative and less reactive. BARs and AARs would assist government to become a learning organization.