If the campaign is lost the war is still won

With just one week to go before the Referendum it is apparent that while the "Yes" case has won the argument – being a Republican of one hue or another is the clear majority position – it has lost the campaign. That does not mean that the "No" case will win, just that it has made better use of what it was given.

The "No" case had some natural advantages. In the first place, people know what they dislike more than they know what they like. It is easier to mobilize them against a proposition rather than for it.

Secondly the onus of proof is always against the reformer. There has to be a very clear and demonstrated benefit before people will change.

Thirdly, John Howard opposes change and has loaded the bases against it. A more open approach to the republican question would have been to first establish whether the country wanted change, and then to determine from a number of models, which one it was that they wanted. That would have taken a number of referenda, and been cumbersome, but would have represented a high point in participatory democracy in this country. Its result might also have been the same as what we will get from this poll, but there would have been less cause for complaint if it had.

What the Prime Minister has done is to set up a ballot where the choice is between one form of Republic (which polls at the time of the convention showed to be perhaps the least popular republican model), and all the other possible forms of Government. Of course it was always a natural dynamic of the situation that the more closely people looked at the ARM model, or any other, the more likely they would be to find things with which they did not agree. The choice in this referendum accentuates that dynamic.

So the ARM and their allies always had an uphill battle. They have magnified those problems with their campaign tactics and strategy. The "Yes" Campaign has lacked focus. While some of us are clearly obsessed with the referendum, most of the public really couldn’t give a damn. Politics repels them. For a political message to reach these voters it has to be immediately and apparently true, simple, and repeated so frequently that it cannot be ignored.

The "No" campaign has found that focus with the slogan "Vote No to the politicians’ republic". It is simple, taps into the fears and prejudices of ordinary Australians, and unites the various factions within the campaign.

What is the phrase that sums up the "Yes" case? There is no single phrase. As a result "Yes" has run a series of advertisements pushing a number of different lines. This has two effects. None of the messages achieves the reach and frequency for them to sink in. And a multitude of arguments makes the proposal appear complicated, to which the response of the public is "If you don’t understand it, don’t vote for it."

The "Yes" Campaign seems to be labouring under the delusion that you can win a political argument by carefully explaining things to the electorate. This view got a boost after the deliberative poll screened on ABC TV last weekend. There was a significant move in favour of the "Yes" republican model once the participants had been educated on the concepts.

Every political apparatchik dreams that if only he or she could speak to each elector independently and explain the concepts to them, then they would be sure to win their vote. The catch is that you can’t, and even if you could most electors wouldn’t want to know anyway. That most of the participants in the deliberative poll, after years of constitutional argument, didn’t understand the concepts to start with, just proves the point.

It is symbols and emotions that move the average voter. While this seemed to be initially understood by the "Yes" case, they have moved away from it. But symbols and emotions have always been most effective in communicating messages. The great salesmen of ideas from the past all used stories and catchy phrases to communicate. And by great salesmen I am talking of people like Christ, Confucius and Buddha – complicated ideas can be expresssed simply. Most of us understand the world in which we live through emotions and lack the experience, understanding and cranial horsepower to understand it analytically. That is not to be sneered at. It is just the human condition.

The "Yes" case has also failed to learn the lessons from recent election results. The electorate is in a rebellious mood. Tell it what to think and it will do the opposite. It feels excluded and marginalized, and resents the clever middle class, particularly that part of it that resides in Sydney and Melbourne.

Yet the "Yes" case is full of celebrity marketing, particularly by people who live in Sydney and Melbourne, and politicians. This is a turn-off for people with incomes less than $30,000 a year who live anywhere else. No wonder the campaign is lagging in the outlying states.

By contrast the "No" campaign features people who were virtually unknown before this campaign. In a vox populi who would even know who Kerry Jones was? But a fair number of us recognize Malcolm Turnbull. So the "No" case appears to be more grass roots, despite the fact that the argument is run by millionaires on both sides.

Another negative aspect has been the decision of the ALP to campaign for a "Yes" vote. This reinforces the theme of a politician’s republic (as do the complaints of some coalition MP’s who felt their integrity impugned by the "No" case theme). It also potentially alienates some non-Labor voters. True, Howard’s tactical abandonment of the field to his lieutenants is a political gambit as well, but will not be read as such.

There is also the question of campaign discipline. Political campaigns are generally a conversation between two large opponents. Supporters stand on the sideline and barrack, but they don’t tend to get involved. In this campaign, the two teams are fragmented to start with, and there are all sorts of well-wishers on both sides who want to run on to the field and see their names in the headlines. The "No" case seems to have been more successful in limiting these infractions, perhaps because their support tends to come from people who do not have as much access to the media in the first place.

The "No" case has also been more successful in finding common ground between its various factions. While it initially looked like being more fragmented the Monarchists and Direct Election Republicans have settled down well together. Their slogan is flexible enough to accommodate both of them.

This masks one of the features of the campaign, and that is that the only type of government that either side accepts as legitimate is a Republican form. No-one of any weight is defending the Monarchy on the basis of loyalty to the Queen. The "No" case doesn’t admit this, because they have to maintain a delicate balancing act. A hard core of their supporters does believe that the Queen ought to be centre stage, and these are the ones most likely to man polling booths. But to the intellectual Constitutional Monarchists she is just a convenient part of the historical furniture. The real power, such as it is, is with the Governor-General.

On the "Yes" case side something similar happens with the role of the President. Here the balancing act is between those who want to maintain the Westminster system of government, who have to believe that the President represents hardly any change at all, and those who want something else, who have to be convinced that the role of President is something quite important. As the minimalist crowd is least likely to turn out with How-to-Vote cards, the argument has to appear to be slanted towards the importance of the President.

However, the tension has crippled the Republican campaign. They need to demonstrate strong benefits in the change for people to ditch the current system, but if they are too strident, then they will lose a number of minimalists. The "No" case has the luxury of being able to be both in favour of radical change, and no change at all.

Polls suggest that the referendum will be lost. Polls can be, and often are, wrong. They might even now be playing a part in which side wins. If the public believes the proposition will go down, then those who oppose the concept, given that they are drawn from the group least interested in politics, may use that as a reason for not bothering to vote. That it appears lost, but by a narrow margin, might also invigorate the grass roots of the "Yes" campaign.

One area where the "Yes" campaign has outgunned the "No" case has been in the use of the internet. Their website is easy to navigate, informative, and most importantly, interactive. I subscribe to the "Yes" email newsletter, but if there is one put out by the "No" case, I have yet to work out how to get on the list. There are 3,100 net surfers registered on the "Yes" Honour roll, and probably more on their supporters list. If bodies on the day is an issue, then the "Yes" case has a powerful tool to mobilize workers which the "No" case seems to have neglected.

Good ideas can win through, even if they are not marketed well. If the Turnbull model’s time has come, then it may carry the day, despite the factors against it. But whether it does or not, the struggle to get it up has surely done one thing, and that is that our view of our current system has changed radically. Queen and Country has become a thing of the past for most Australians, even those who cherish the institution.