Whitlam's East Timor elephant in the room

The weeks since Whitlam's death have seen an outpouring of tributes and deference that is unprecedented. This is neither surprising nor inappropriate. Whitlam was a giant who impacted on Australian society probably more than any other single individual in the 20^th century, and as far as Australia is concerned overwhelmingly for the better.

Medibank, the Racial Discrimination Act, Aboriginal Land Rights, woman's rights, non-discriminatory immigration, legal reform and federal legal aid, the trade practices act, the abolition of conscription, ending our involvement in Vietnam, recognising China, recognition and promotion of the reality of multiculturalism, support for the arts and for the Australian film industry.

The Whitlam government made it possible for me and others like to me of my generation to go to university. It actively fought against a legacy of racism which has plagued Australian society since federation.

As a teacher I must particularly applaud the Whitlam government's contribution to school education, a commitment to equity and quality and specifically to public education not matched since. This record is particularly impressive given the two half terms Whitlam served, a total of three interrupted and strife torn years against an obstructionist opposition determined to stifle his reforms and bring down his government.

While these accomplishments were not Whitlam's alone, he was certainly a pivotal figure. His legacy more than any other single individual has made us more tolerant, fairer, more egalitarian, more accepting of diversity, more outward looking, more modern, more sophisticated, freer. He had a profound impact on us as a nation, not only on how we live but who we are.

Yet to the bestowing of unconstrained sainthood there remains a huge elephant in the room, one mentioned by but a few and emphasised by even fewer.

Demographic analysis by Sarah Staveteig of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis indicates that in the years of Indonesian occupation of East Timor around a third of the population died. It is, proportionally, one of the greatest human caused tragedies of the 20^th century. It was also one in which Whitlam played a significant role.

Whitlam offered firm encouragement for an Indonesian takeover of East Timor in the early stages of the decolonisation process, after the change of government in Portugal, when events were yet to unfold and the situation still unformed. In a meeting with Suharto in Yogyakarta, Java on 6 September 1974 he told the Indonesian President that East Timor was too small to be independent and that, "independence would be unwelcome to Australia, to Indonesia and to other countries in the region". In apparent contradiction given the clear preference of the Timorese people, he stated incorporation with Indonesia should preferably be achieved through an act of self-determination. Yet his actions and attitude then and later made it clear that it was the former policy objective which would take priority. A departmental memo records him telling Australian diplomats that while he favoured incorporation, "obeisance" should be made towards self-determination so not to, "create argument in Australia which would make people critical of Indonesia". The Indonesian understanding of the meeting was clear, with Major-General Ali Murtopo later telling the Australian Ambassador that prior to Whitlam's meeting the Suharto regime had been undecided about its Timor policy, but that Whitlam's support had caused them to crystallise their thinking to that of firmly supporting incorporation.

Once announced, Whitlam's stated position to Suharto increasingly became policy, with Whitlam's own actions making it so. The issue was never taken to cabinet, and Whitlam resisted pressure from some Labor parliamentarians and from the Portuguese government to re-open the Australian consulate in Dili, stating that such a move could be "misinterpreted".

Ignoring increasingly clear evidence for Timorese support for independence, in a second meeting with Suharto in Townsville in April 1975 Whitlam repeated, arguably in even stronger terms, his government's support of integration. Murtopo would later tell an Australian journalist they regarded this as a "green light" for absorption of the territory.

In the last months of his prime ministership Whitlam ignored calls from Fretilin forces, who had taken possession of the territory after a brief civil war not of their own making and partly orchestrated by Indonesia, for a Portuguese return or international intervention to support orderly decolonisation. In a strong public hint to the Suharto regime, he referred to Indonesia in parliament as "the only force capable of restoring calm in the territory". He refused repeated requests from Jose Ramos Horta on behalf of Fretilin for Australia to send in a negotiating team to end the conflict. He refused to react to increasing Indonesian incursions and destabilisation despite clear intelligence from the Australian embassy in Jakarta about what was happening. He even failed to take up the deaths of five Australian based journalists in Balibo on 16 September, despite immediate intelligence from the Defence Signals Division (DSD) that Indonesian forces were responsible. This would have been another clear signal to Indonesia that whatever action it took would not entail repercussions from Australia.

None of this was pre-determined. His own foreign minister, Senator Don Willesee, had originally pressed for a policy in support of an act of genuine self-determination. Sections of the Department of defence also made submissions before the invasion arguing for acceptance of an independent East Timor. Former Whitlam Government Minister Tom Uren, who had visited the territory during the period of Fretilin control, later told a 1999 Senate inquiry he believed the Indonesians were initially reluctant to invade and that a diplomatic intervention in favour of genuine self-determination may well have made a difference.

The Indonesian invasion was not inevitable and it is very much within the bounds if possibility that a different approach by Australia, particularly support for an orderly transition as Fretilin had been requesting, would have produced a different outcome. As it is, the evidence is strong that Whitlam's urgings to the Suharto regime to annex the territory were an important determining factor in its decision to do so.

Whitlam's defenders have argued that before the invasion Whitlam could not have known the extent of the atrocities and suffering that would be inflicted on the Timorese people. The Suharto regime's record in having killed upwards of half a million of its own citizens ten years earlier, as well as the murderous behaviour of Indonesian forces during their early incursions in the territory would appear to have provided at least some indications. In any case it is not an argument which can apply to his actions afterwards.

The Indonesian invasion starting on 7 December 1975, after Whitlam's dismissal, met strong resistance from the Timorese people, with Fretilin in the early years holding a large amount of territory and organising a functioning society in the mountains. The Indonesian military responded with a deliberate campaign of destroying crops and livestock. Civilian populations were forced to surrender, and were detained in transit and resettlement camps, both short of food, shelter and medical care. The result was a major famine. It was in this period, the late 1970s, in which human rights abuses were at their height and in which the greatest number of Timorese fatalities occurred. Timorese resistance continued during the 1980s, as did the suffering of the Timorese people, with Timorese military resistance met with indiscriminate revenge attacks on the civilian population.

While Indonesia kept East Timor closed to the outside world, there was more than sufficient evidence of what was happening to those who wanted to know. From 1975 to 1978 a clandestine radio link between Fretilin and Australian supporters brought news of the territory to the wider world. Sources such as Community Aid Abroad, The Red Cross and elements of the Catholic Church funnelled information. In 1977 the Dunn Report, based on interviews with East Timorese refugees in Portugal by former Australian consul to East Timor James Dunn, documented the nature of the deprivations faced by the Timorese people.

It was in this context that former Prime Minister Whitlam chose to use his considerable status and influence as a centre left former leader of a western nation to become one the most forthright advocates for the Suharto regime and the occupation. On the invitation of Suharto he visited the then closed territory in March 1982, publically praising its "new schools...new and reconstructed hospitals…more kilometres of asphalt road and…increasing amounts of food". He denounced Catholic cleric Monsignor do Costa Lopes, who had attempted to bring what was happening to the world's attention, accusing him of being "a liar", "a mendacious and malicious correspondent" and of "suffering from a crisis of identity". In November 1982 Whitlam appeared before the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation, stating that, "It is high time that the question of East Timor was voted off the United Nations agenda and cease to preoccupy and distract the nations of South-east Asia and the Pacific." He belittled and campaigned against those raising human rights concerns about the territory both in Australia and abroad. Years later he bitterly criticised then Labor spokesperson on foreign affairs, Laurie Brereton when he orientated Labor's East Timor policy in a different direction. At no time did Whitlam express any regret for his actions, nor credible concern for the welfare of the people of East Timor.

Whitlam's success or otherwise in keeping the issue off the international agenda and prolonging the occupation will continue to be a matter of historical debate. But a different position by someone of Whitlam's standing and gravitas may well have had at least a mitigating effect on the undeniable and atrocious abuses happening in East Timor had he chosen to use his considerable influence and talents to bring them to the attention of the world.

The contrast between Whitlam's profound insight and achievement in other areas, his humanity, his grasp of policy, his understanding of and respect for human rights, and his willed blindness and inhumanity in regard to his greatest human rights failure is nothing short of astonishing. But leaders, particularly those who aspire to greatness, as Whitlam certainly did, are responsible for all of their actions not only some of them.

Were it not for East Timor the most enduring and representative image of Whitlam's legacy would probably be that of him trickling the soil of the land of the Gurindji people into the hands of Vincent Lingiari. But that is counterfactual history, and as it is in the long term view of posterity the enormous and unnecessary suffering of the people of East Timor will inevitably weigh strongly on the other side of the ledger. It is part of Whitlam's legacy which cannot be erased and that should not be ignored.