Double dating the US and the PRC

This was appropriate enough - or at least not totally inappropriate - in the past, but things have changed. Australia's position in the world has been transformed by the emergence of China. We are now more dependent on China as a market for our exports than we were on Britain after World War II, more in fact than we have been on any single market in the last 63 years. Britain, America and Japan were not only less important to us in the past than China is now, they were all friendly; while China is not overtly hostile, concerns are growing in Canberra over Beijing's rapid military modernisation and its demonstrated willingness to bully its neighbours.

It would be nice to believe that Australia can somehow continue to run a foreign policy based, on the one hand, on security through close ties to America, and on the other, on prosperity through close ties to China. Quite possibly it can: quite possibly (even quite probably) military rivalry between China and America will not lead to hostilities. In the meantime, however, America is expecting Australia to earn its keep: ASB requires submarines to lie in wait, engines silenced, on the floor of the Lombok and Sunda Straits, ready to intercept enemy (read Chinese) shipping, should the worst eventuate. Not to put too fine a point on it, our prime strategic partner would expect us to sink the shipping of our prime trading partner. It should be an interesting moment.

Interesting, but not desirable.

Kevin Rudd saw the problem. Unilateral US primacy in the western Pacific, he warned, is not sustainable in the long term; a clear Chinese primacy is not desirable from the point of view of America's allies, and, given American opposition, not easily attainable in any case; the answer is a third way in which both powers accommodate the legitimate interests of the other. (Hugh White's essay in the Interpreter of 19 December 2012 is an excellent overview and entry point). The answer was not more military spending, but more diplomacy and more openness.

Rudd's proposed "Asia-Pacific Community" never eventuated, but he professed himself satisfied that the East Asia Summit would fulfill the same role - a forum focused on security issues where the participants could debate matters of common interest. How is will be used in future (President Obama was unfortunately not present in Brunei this year) remains to be seen, but it represents the major opportunity for diplomacy to ensure that the future isn't totally in the hands of military strategists.