Winning the peace in Mali

The desert dust is settling in Mali. The separatist rebellion that threatened to spill out over adjacent countries in north-west Africa has been quelled and French forces have secured as much of the country as matters.

In the sprawling, pollution-ridden capital, Bamako, the talk is turning to politics. The country's largest party, Adema-PASJ, otherwise known as the Alliance for Democracy, has selected a 46-year-old mining engineer, Dramane Dembele, as its candidate for the July presidential election. If everything goes to plan – and that can be a big 'if' in Mali – he will replace the party's interim president, Dioncounda Traore, who has agreed to step down.

Meanwhile the first troops of the French expeditionary force which crushed the mixture of Tuareg separatists, Islamic militants and opportunists are preparing to leave. The rebellion that had overrun the north of the country and was threatening the capital itself is, for the moment, over. The plan is that the French will be replaced by an 11,000-strong African Union force to keep the peace in the interim, bolstered by a European Union mission training the Malian Army to a level where it can take over the security of its own country.

But what seems to be a workable road map to return Mali to full civilian democracy is papering over what may be insurmountable problems in the long term. One of Australia's leading authorities on terrorism methods, Professor Clive Williams of the Australian National University, doubts Mali can ever be a workable entity in its present form.

"I do not see how the country can continue as it is currently constituted," he says.

"Countering terrorism there will require continuing Western resources. Faced with strong opposition, extremists just melt away and regroup elsewhere. Crossing international boundaries is as simple as driving into the desert and avoiding the border posts.

"There are also many isolated Western targets they can hit – we should remember there are about 5000 Australians working in the African resources sector and some are potential targets.

"All this is happening at a time when most developed countries are trying to wind back their defence budgets and don't want these kinds of international involvements.

"As for the proposed African Union force – I don't think it will get anything like the numbers needed."

Making Mali self-sufficient in security will be a monumental task. The 7000-strong army is little more than a rabble, poorly led and prone to desertions, especially when there is any real fighting to be done. Its performance once it was bolstered by the arrival of the French forces was an embarrassment, with accusations of summary executions of opponents and ill-treatment of civilians in the wake of the advance north.

It is a situation not lost on the man responsible for the training and re-training, French Brigadier General Francoise Lecointre.

"Objectively the army must be entirely rebuilt," General Lecointre said. "The Malian authorities are well aware of the need to reconstruct the army, very aware that Mali almost disappeared due to the failings of the institution."

The first fully-trained battalion of Malian troops is due to be operational by July, and the entire army must be ready in 15 months. Given the decade or more it has taken to prepare the Afghan Army for similar duties, the timeline is nothing short of laughable.

So what is the best way forward? The new Government in Bamako should open negotiations with the northern Tuaregs with a view to meeting at least some of their demands. A semi-autonomous northern entity bound to the south in a loose federation might be one answer.

The Tuaregs, traditional desert dwellers whose customs and hierarchies reach back into the mists of history, have no great interest in the aims of such groups as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Indeed some of them readily defected to the French and helped to root out their former 'allies'. If they can be persuaded to be part of the solution rather than the problem, they might prove to be an effective police force against further militant incursions.

Mali also has significant natural resources – gold, iron ore and natural gas are among its riches – but lack of access to a port has been a deterrent to large-scale development. This is one area where other African nations can help.

Lifting the majority of the population out of abject poverty is a sure way of curbing militant tendencies among the 48 per cent of Malians who are 15 or under. A British social anthropologist at All Souls College, Oxford, Judith Scheele, who has first-hand experience of Mali, told the BBC that gaining access to weapons was an easy way of raising a person's social status in the country.

Dr Scheele said the best way to gain those weapons was to join a group that had the al-Qaeda logo, even though its activities might be more directed to kidnapping for ransom or other banditry rather than the spread of militant Islam.

She said many observers believe that while Mali presents challenges, they are not the same ones as the West continues to face in Afghanistan, and comments by world leaders such as British Prime Minister David Cameron linking the two are simplistic and counter-productive.

Worse still, any attempts to use the same methods that have been employed in Afghanistan might result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, uniting the currently disparate and often warring factions that operate in the area.

The Malian insurgency is a demonstration of what can happen when local grievances are ignored and opportunists cross porous borders to fuel and profit from the conflict. The initial response from the French has been appropriate and effective.

What happens next is once again going to demonstrate that peace is always harder to wage than war. The West cannot afford another Afghanistan-style situation in North Africa. It should therefore do everything possible to avoid creating one.