We cannot win the Afghanistan war

Despite these occurrences we are cautioned not to jump to conclusions about systemic problems, but what about reports of Afghan forces uncovering a counterfeit military uniform factory in Kabul? As British academic, author and Conservative politician Rory Stewart so eloquently put it:

...Beginning in 2004, every general came in saying, "I've inherited a dismal situation, but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy, which will deliver," in General Barno's word in 2004, the "decisive year." Well guess what? It didn't. But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying that he had the strategy and the resources to deliver, in 2005, the "decisive year." Or General David Richards to come in 2006 and say he had the strategy and the resources to deliver the "crunch year." Or in 2007, the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide, to say that that would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2008, Major General Champoux to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2009, my great friend, General Stanley McChrystal, who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year." Or in 2010, the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband, who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year." And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today, that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, assures us that we are in the "decisive year....

In 1996 General (Ret) Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and Lester Grau wrote:

That the Soviet concept for military occupation of Afghanistan was based on stabilising the country by garrisoning the main routes, major cities, airbases and logistics sites; relieving the Afghan government forces of garrison duties and pushing them into the countryside to battle the resistance; providing logistic, air, artillery and intelligence support to the Afghan forces; providing minimum interface between the Soviet occupation forces and the local populace; accepting minimal Soviet casualties; and strengthening the Afghan forces, so once defeated, the Soviet Army could be withdrawn.

Like us, the Russians tried to impose military and social reforms; like us, they implemented economic measures that worsened the conditions for the impoverished, and they detained, tortured and executed enemies of the 'state' and bombed large numbers of Afghans into fleeing their homes and their country, all of which is happening today.

In a country where millions of Afghans still live in poverty an Afghan National Army officer gets about $US170 as a starting monthly wage. On top of that they can receive specialty pays and enhancements, longevity pay and promotions. The Afghan National Army pay is bankrolled entirely by the United States. The Soviets tried that too, and failed: they attempted during the first year of their occupation to rebuild the depleted Afghan army, first by inducements like pay rises and reenlistment bonuses and then by more stringent measures like more stringent conscription laws and impressment. They failed not only because their regime was unpopular but also because the warfare in which potential recruits would be engaged was repugnant to most Afghans. There were widespread desertions, as there are today.

The war in Afghanistan can't be won, and Afghanistan isn't ours - or anyone else's - to lose. Australia will not form part of the peace process or be required to broker a peace deal. Many lives have been lost, many others ruined and money squandered in Afghanistan, but it's not a sign of weakness to admit that we've made a mistake. Rhetoric about 'progress being made' will not re-cast the war in a more favourable light. It is what it is. Futile.