Bin Laden's unpaid media push

The UN, loaded already with so many obligations, seems unlikely to be able to undertake the task, at the necessary level, of influencing would-be bombers. It could also be vulnerable to accusations of religious interference.

Some western governments in the past have used D Notices to squash stories regarded as dangerous if published in times of war. Again, a highly controversial measure, especially when bureaucrats or the military are seen to hold undue influence. And, in the present circumstances, can we be judged to be “at war” as understood in the past? The US certainly thinks it is a war. So could D Notices be a useful mechanism to restrict “the oxygen of publicity”? Would the media see the need to honour it?

Adrienne Wilmoth Lerner, in encyclopedia.com, writes: that a D Notice (defence notice) refers to an alert given by intelligence services or the armed forces to the media, warning them of sensitive content that could damage national security or defence if reported in part or in whole. “In Britain, the system is somewhat voluntary and various media corporations are not obliged to report or refrain from reporting, potentially sensitive issues.” D Notices also cover media broadcast content via radio, films, television, and the Internet.

D Notices were employed during the Gulf War after several government and military officials from various nations complained that intense media coverage let Iraq prepare for every American strike. She comments, “In late 2002, a new rash of D Notices was issued for information coming from military operations in the Middle East. Some journalists hold that D Notices are too often issued for subjects that are merely unflattering to government, rather than a matter of national defence and thus are a form of soft censorship.

“On the whole, media companies and individual journalists are increasingly opting out of cooperating with D Notices advisories, when possible. However, there is always the possibility of professional disciplinary action, or legal punishment, such as suspension of broadcasting privileges or a steep fine, for refusal to heed some especially sensitive D Notice warnings.” There is a voluntary system of D Notices in Australia.

Don't panic. Fear is al-Qaeda's real goal, writes Fareed Zakaria in the Washington Post (January 11, 2010). Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International. He says when responding to the attempted bombing of the airliner on Christmas Day, US Senator Dianne Feinstein voiced the feelings of many when she said that to prevent such situations, "I'd rather overreact than underreact":

“This appears to be the consensus view in Washington, but it is quite wrong. The purpose of terrorism is to provoke an overreaction. Its real aim is not to kill the hundreds of people directly targeted but to sow fear in the rest of the population. Terrorism is an unusual military tactic in that it depends on the response of the onlookers. If we are not terrorised, then the attack didn't work. Alas, this one worked very well.”

After the former Howard government introduced anti-terrorism legislation, seen by many as a threat to the freedom of the press, concern about where Australia was going prompted action by an alliance of newspaper executives, usually in hot and ruthless competition. Known as the Right to Know Coalition, they got together to defend free speech, saying: “Australia’s Right to Know is a coalition of 12 major media companies formed in May 2007 to address concerns about free speech. The coalition is working with the Commonwealth and state governments to establish new policy and best practice to improve Australian’s relatively poor world ranking for freedom of speech.” The alliance created keener awareness within the public about what was being legislated and the importance of freedom of speech.

It is perhaps too far-out to suggest that this or similar media coalition, with international counterparts, could, would or should encourage any collective censorship to ban reporting of acts of terror. Much as it would likely be highly effective. But it is possible a concerted media effort could be organised to try to constructively influence would-be bombers - to care about themselves. There is an opportunity here. Could a similar alliance, and parallel international organisations, be prevailed upon to undertake a collective attempt to influence would-be suicide bombers on the basis they should think first of themselves, of their families, of their own potential? Misguided, murderous, misinformed and misled, they are people too.

There need be no attempt to convert anybody to a particular faith, philosophy, way of life or set of principles, only an effort to convince young people for their own sake - so keen often to be seen as heroes - not to take part in any murderous action. That sacrificing their own life is too big a price to pay for the oxygen of publicity, no matter the cause.

In an excellent article under the title, “We need a smarter way to fight the jihadi elite”, Anne Applebaum writes in the Washington Post (January 12, 2010), that there is a need for another kind of anti-terrorism strategy. She describes an international jihadi elite which engages in constant debates - in Internet chat rooms, in the halls of publishing houses, in mosques. She asks: “Are they hearing enough counterarguments? Are we helping the people who make the counterarguments?”

This seems the most sensible way to go. Do we, for instance, also need to move into universities and colleges to warn students that suicide bombing is not an answer - a life sacrificed for only Fifteen Minutes of Fame when it could have been used so much more constructively?