Keeping an eye on the watchers

With the possible exception of France, no other democracy allows its official intelligence agencies total freedom from parliamentary oversight the way Australia does.

Purists can argue that ministers are accountable to the Parliament for the activities of their department but that is not the real world.

The Prime Minister (Office of National Assessments) and the ministers for Defence (Defence Intelligence Agency, Defence Signals Directorate), Foreign Affairs (Australian Secret Intelligence Service) and Attorney-General (Australian Security Intelligence Organization) have the heaviest workloads in the Parliament.

Therefore it is impossible for them to have effective oversight and therefore be properly accountable for their agencies.

Legally, the office of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security supervises the agencies and sees that they comply with Australian Law. The Inspector General reports in a sanitised way to the Parliament annually.

In 1987, the Hawke government amended the ASIO Act and created the Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO. The committee is an exercise in utter futility because it is forbidden to inquire into any matter relating to foreign nationals, to foreign intelligence, the operations of ASIO or any complaints about the organization. In 1995, My Justice Samuels in an inquiry into ASIS, recommended that a single joint parliamentary committee be set up to oversee both ASIO and ASIS. Five years on, nothing has been done despite the then-government's acceptance of the proposal.

Without a formal committee structure, the parliament is unable to have access to the agencies. No questions are ever answered about their activities by ministers.

Officers of ASIO appear before the ASIO Committee; on rare occasions DIO will appear before the Defence Committee but no representatives of the other three ever appear. No question has ever been asked of a Prime Minister about ONA. It is impossible for the Parliament to make a qualitative assessment of any agency's performance.

The agencies have a budget of at least $445 million annually but it is impossible for the Parliament to make a statement that the money is spent effectively.

Oversight of intelligence agencies cannot take place through the public avenues used for all other departments of state. Oversight of secret agencies must take place in secret.

Different countries use different approaches. The United States Congress through appropriate committees has access down to the most minute detail. Their committee chairmen are briefed on a daily basis on operational matters.

There are inherently great risks to security in such a high degree of exposure but apparently there have been no lapses in security as a consequence. It can be argued, though, that such a depth of exposure is unnecessary for adequate accountability.

I believe the appropriate system for Australia would be a committee of parliamentarians appointed by the Prime Minister, as opposed to a parliamentary committee where members are answerable directly to Parliament.

A committee of five senior senators and members drawn from the Government and Opposition appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, would satisfy our needs.

The Prime Minister has the means to select those who satisfy security requirements and the right to appoint therefore carries with it the right of removal.

The duties of the committee - which would report to the Prime Minister and through his office to the Parliament - would be defined as "the power to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of ASIO, ASIS, DSD, DIO and ONA.

Such a remit would give adequate powers to satisfy the requirements of accountability and at the same time preserve the agencies from having to expose any operational details.

Opponents of parliamentary oversight argue that if it is introduced then it should be only in a limited way and restricted to those organizations where field activity is involved for the collection of intelligence - ASIO and ASIS.

These are the agencies where human lives are at risk and where most opportunities exist for the law to be broken.

Analytical office-bound agencies such as DIO, ONA and DSD, should be excluded. But this argument is fallacious as the Wispelaire case shows.

Proposals for the introduction of over-sight procedures meet no opposition with the Parliament. Relevant ministers and members of all parties agree to the need. The only opposition comes from within the bureaucracy who wish to retain the power that flows from controlling sources of information.

A parliamentary committee brings two further advantages to what is an inward looking secret group. It brings fresh ideas and insights and it also acts as a safety valve for disaffected agents. One of the great risks comes from disaffected personnel feeling they can get no redress for their grievances.

Australians entrust substantial powers over their liberties to their intelligence services and therefore must be sure of the highest sense of integrity and prudence.

They need the assurance of adequate parliamentary oversight.