Australia's contribution to nuclear proliferation risks

And while there's little that Australia can do to de-escalate that situation in North Korea, there is much that could be done to de-escalate broader nuclear proliferation tensions in north-east Asia.

In particular, the pursuit of reprocessing technology by Japan, South Korea and China clearly escalates regional tensions as it involves plutonium separation and thus provides a direct pathway to nuclear weapons feedstock.

Australia could - but doesn't - refuse permission for Japan to stockpile plutonium separated from spent nuclear fuel produced in reactors powered by Australian uranium.

Australia could make it clear that Australia will no longer supply uranium to South Korea unless it abandons its attempts to develop reprocessing technology.

And Australia could encourage China to abandon its plans for a large, unnecessary reprocessing plant, and make it clear that permission to reprocess Australian-origin nuclear materials in any such reprocessing plant will not be forthcoming.

Instead, Australia has fallen into the trap of bending over backwards to support its allies on an international scale, and subordinating non-proliferation objectives to the commercial interests of the (mostly foreign-owned) uranium companies operating in Australia.

The irony is that as one of the top uranium suppliers, we have power to rewrite the script. But successive governments tend to prioritise political expediency and corporate profits over the moral high ground.

Australia's uranium industry contributes to proliferation risks and tensions, and contributes next-to-nothing to the national economy. Hence, a strong case can be made to get out of the industry altogether.