Why say and commit funding to 'deradicalisation' but not deliver on the promise?

Australia’s preferences for hard counter terrorism measures over soft is in striking contrast to the political rhetoric and funding committed in recent years. The introduction of anti-terrorism laws indicate that Australia is in pursuit of quick counter terrorism solutions, leaving the underlying problems unresolved, namely implementing ‘deradicalisation’ programs in our penal systems.

International attacks claimed by Islamic State have substantially increased public social fears of Islamic extremism and home-grown terrorism, making all efforts to deter the extremist threat a political and social priority. And yet, a national or even state rehabilitation program that specifically targets this problem in our custody has not previously been, nor currently is, operational.

The discussions date back to 2010 with the White Paper “Securing Australia, Protecting Community’, and the establishment of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Unit in the Attorney Generals Department, where they sought to invest $9.7million to initiativesand programs designed to target extremism. It was identified and included in this strategy that supporting rehabilitation and ‘deradicalisation’ programs in our Correctional Services was a key element to reducing the Australian extremist threat.

Further and significant funding was later announced in August 2014 for a counter terrorism (CT) package worth $630million and within that, $13.4million was allocated to a CVE strategy that focused on programs and initiatives to tackle ‘resilience’ and ‘radicalisation’, specifically - ‘deradicalisation’ programs.

The Minister for Justice, Michael Keenan, followed on from this at the renowned Malaysian International Conference on “Deradicalisation and Countering Violent Extremism” (January 2016) and said: 

Prisons are another priority area for the Australian Government. Australia has a small but increasing number of prisoners showing signs of radicalisation. Recognising this, the government has funded a number of programmes in Australian prisons to address the problem.

Then why are ‘deradicalisation programs’ still not evident, when the actions, words and more importantly, the million-dollar funding commitments from the Australian Government for the past seven years maintain that prison radicalisation is a serious threat that needs to be tackled and that they will, indeed, address it?

‘Deradicalisation programs’ attempt to disengage or redirect convicted terrorists of their militant and sectarian views of Islamic violent extremism. They aim to mitigate the potential threat whilst terrorists are detained, and when due to be released back into society.

Deradicalisation is broadly considered to be a tool that supports counter terrorism strategies, however the methodology lacks support globally, and subsequently generates mostly haphazard approaches. This is largely a result of ‘deradicalisation programs’ not receiving sustained efforts to measure their impact, but more importantly it is because the concept of ‘deradicalisation’ lacks genuine belief and therefore stagnates its development.

For instance, Professor Boaz Ganor from the International Policy for Counter Terrorism said:

I don’t believe in deradicalisation in general terms because once those people have been radicalised, it is practically impossible to uproot those ideas in their heads.

If it is cognitively assumed that a person can go from A to B, why is it not plausible that a person has the potential to reverse their thinking, or alternatively ‘disengage’ from the violence; the latter is arguably considered, to be more of a viable option in academic circles. Both options are worth pursuing, and regardless of the probability of success, a defeatist perspective towards ‘deradicalisation’ is irresponsible considering the current growing problem.

This is because, at any given time the Government has a tangible, unpredictable and vulnerable group of people in a Correctional facility that could pass on extreme and violent views to other inmates. Such extremist ideologies may be absorbed by those without any previous connections or understandings of Islamic extremism; and to their friends and family, including trade-craft and networks, if nothing is done to redirect or limit the infiltration of radical ideology.

The Government also runs the risk, that these criminals will return to the community with a deeper, more radicalised view and carry out further or new terrorist activity. Such a result would be considered neglectful, and reinforces why the Government has previously identified the need for ‘deradicalisation programs’ to counter the terrorism threat of today.  Therefore, these programs should be treated as main stream business in our penal system, but they are not.

Instead, the Government introduced the “High Risk Terrorist Offender Bill” in September 2016. A move by the Liberal Party indicating a panacea for solving the issue of Islamic terrorism in Australia, and again avoiding Australia’s original financial and public commitments of tackling the issue at its core.

The Bill is designed for convicted terrorists in Australia to be detained beyond their sentencing, if they are considered to remain a security threat when released back into the community. The potential threat is determined by a third party “relevant expert…who is competent to assess the risk of a terrorist offender”. This could be a medical practitioner and a psychologist registered under the State or Territory, or “any other expert”. The Criminal Code Act 1995 – “High Risk Offenders” is an existing Bill for further detainment of sexual or violent offenders (AA) who are considered to not be rehabilitated when approaching their release date. It now has been amended (2016) to include Terrorist offenders.

The amendment to include terrorists is practical when addressing the seriousness of the threat, however the data to support the move is inadequate, and supportive of an overarching security first model, rather than addressing the root causes of extremism.

The number of convicted terrorists currently behind bars since September 2014 in Australia totals 55 people. In comparison there were 3,406 sex offense sending in prison sentences just in 2016. The large and consistent number of sexual offenders has generated sufficient research and data to track recidivism, and has provided clear indicators of prisoners who still present a significant threat to the community if released. The recidivism data for terrorists is yet to be established, and the nominated “experts” are highly questionable at such an early phase of the Australian terrorism landscape.

What this Bill does not cater for, is the infiltration of extremism to other inmates who are in prison for lesser offenses. This Bill is designed for those who are categorised only as “violent offenders” or AA. If a prisoner who is sentenced for a lesser crime becomes radicalised while incarcerated and is undetected, this detainment order cannot and will not be served on him, and so the threat to our community still remains.

This Bill indicates a declining approach for ‘deradicalisation programs’ being supported in Australia, even though considerable funding and discussion has been committed to the cause. It suggests three main points moving forward on the Government’s position:

1. the Government does not support the ‘deradicalisation’ concept;
2. they have yet to test ‘deradicalisation programs’, although they have committed funding to the initiative;
3. and the Government is not concerned with home-grown terrorism and infiltration of extremism within our prisons. 

Furthermore, if prisoners are not receiving appropriate rehabilitation programs whilst incarcerated, it is creating a potential situation that a convicted terrorist may never be released, by not providing adequate opportunity to reform. This may be unethical, and suggests that the Government are over-simplifying the problem, by profiling convicted terrorists to probably be a security concern beyond the end of their sentence

The Bill may also conceive a new and worrying situation that could impact Australian civilians. If Corrections are detaining prisoners who are considered to still be a threat without specific rehabilitation programs in place; Corrections and Government may be risking an increase, or a sustained prison environment of heightened extremism that has the potential to expand beyond the prison walls through family and friends. This would be a critical space that could not be ignored regardless of the Government’s position on ‘deradicalisation’.

It appears that Australia is not sold on ‘deradicalisation’ even though funding has been committed to it. If this is the case, the government should explain their position and stop the confusing and false rhetoric that rehabilitation is a strategic focal area when clearly it is not. They should also be held accountable for detailing where previous CT and CVE funding has been expended, if it has not gone to ‘deradicalisation’.